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Give not to son or wife, brother or friend, power over thee while thou livest; and
give not thy estate to another, lest thou repent, and entreat for the same....
In all thy works keep the pre-eminence.... In the time when thou shall end
the days of thy life, and in the time of thy decease, distribute thy inheritance.
Ecclesiasticus 33:20-24.
THOUGH THE BIBLICAL EXHORTATION tO keep the pre-eminence is as appro-
priate today as ever, the wisdom of the suggested application, "in the time
of thy decease, distribute thy inheritance," might well be questioned by the
modem estate planner. For the uncertainty, delay, and expense that fre-
quently attend the testamentary gift as it passes through probate and admin-
istration have caused many people to seek a different means of providing for
the posthumous distribution of their property among their families and
friends. The revocable trust has proven to be a popular answer to this quest.
For the revocable trust enables a settlor to retain his pre-eminence while mak-
ing a gift which technically is not testamentary and which therefore need
not pass through probate and administration.
The popularity that the revocable trust has achieved indicates that so-
ciety has found such dispositions useful and convenient. As a means of pre-
serving one's pre-eminence, however, the revocable trust is only of limited
utility for it is a rather complex device, unsuited to all types of property and
the needs of all individuals. Thus it is difficult to use a trust to implement a
disposition of tangible personalty, since such property does not yield income
0 This article is based on material submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of S.J.D., University of Michigan. Included are parts I through IV. The con-
cluding sections will appear in 16 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. No. 3.
"Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Catholic University of America Law School.
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and thus provides no funds from which the current expenses of maintaining
the property and operating the trust can be paid. And, regardless of the na-
ture of the property, the cost of administering a trust generally renders its
use impracticable unless the disposition involves property of substantial
value.
It is the purpose of this paper to determine whether a prospective donor
can keep his pre-eminence by retaining a power or right of revocation while
making a gift of personalty without using the instrumentality of trust. At
this point, the reader might be tempted to lay this paper aside, firm in his
conviction that though such a result might be accomplished with a gift causa
mortis, the law prohibits donors from attempting to retain a power of revo-
cation in any other type of donative transaction. Certainly there are state-
ments in many of the cases' and texts2 that seem to justify this attitude. Yet it
should be remembered that the revocable trust has grown into a popular
means of disposing of property in the United States only during the past
few generations and that many courts have recently had to reconsider their
attitude toward some of these trusts in order to recognize their validity.3
Now that the law of trusts has progressed to its present point, it seems proper
to re-examine the law of gifts to see why revocable donations cannot be ac-
complished by this simpler instrumentality.
Though the distinctions will not be developed at this point, two cases in
which courts sustained as valid gifts inter vivos transactions in which the
donors reserved powers of revocation will be mentioned here in the hope of
sustaining the reader's perserverance through the rest of the study. In
Blanchard v. Sheldon,4 Aurilla Ballou wanted to give three hundred dollars
to her nephew, Daniel Blanchard, but she was afraid that she might need
the money before she died. To accomplish her purpose, she lent the money
to the defendant and had him execute in return the following note: "For
value received I promise to pay to Aurilla Ballou, three hundred dollars
with annual interest, on demand, if she called for it before she deceased, if
not to be paid to Daniel Blanchard by her order." The aunt subsequently
died, not having called for the money. Suit was instituted to determine
1 See, e.g., Baugh v. Howze, 211 Ark. 222, 199 S.W.2d 940 (1947); Kriedel v. Krampits, 157
Conn. 532, 79 A.2d 181 (1951); Kraus v. Kraus, 235 Ind. 325, 132 N.E.2d 608 (1956); Bryant's
Administrator v. Bryant, 269 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1954); In re Hamilton's Estate, 26 Wash. 2d
363, 174 P.2d 301 (f946).
2 See 1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 32 (1947); 38 C.J.S. Gifts
§ 39 (1943).
' The changing attitude of the courts with respect to revocable trusts in which the settlor
retains substantial elements of control over the trustee may be seen in the various amend-
ments that were made to Sec. 57 of the Restatement of Trusts between the publication of
the first and second editions.
143 Vt. 512 (1871).
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whether the nephew or Mrs. Ballou's executor was entitled to the principal
sum. The court held in favor of the nephew, saying:
We think this delivery vested the property in the $300 in the plaintiff, subject
to be defeated only by his aunt's taking some further action in regard to it; and
that the transaction can be upheld as a gift inter vivos.
In Gould v. VanHorne,5 the donor gave twenty thousand dollars to a
friend. At the time of the gift, it was agreed between the parties that the
donee would pay interest on the sum to his benefactor for her life and that
if she wanted any additional sums he would "take and advance it to her."
The donee fully complied with the terms of the transaction. After the donor's
death, her executor brought suit to recover that part of the original sum
that the donor had not demanded during her life and which had not been
returned to her. In holding for the donee, the court said:
It was the donor's intent to make an absolute gift of the money in question to
the defendant. If such was her intention it would not be defeated by the further
fact that she required of the defendant that he pay interest on the sum given
during her lifetime, nor even that he give her back some of the principal, if
desired.
It is clear that the donor in each of these cases was able to "keep the pre-
eminence" until her death. In the first, Mrs. Ballou could have revoked the
gift and prevented her nephew from enjoying any part of the three hundred
dollars merely by demanding full payment of the note before her death; and
in the latter, the donor could have revoked by demanding that the donee
repay the full twenty thousand dollars at any time she wished. But at the
death of each donor, the court gave effect to the obvious intention of the
parties and sustained both transactions as valid gifts inter vivos. Unless these
cases and several others that will be discussed later are to be dismissed as "bad
law," several nice distinctions must be made to harmonize them with the
multitude of clearly sound cases holding void other attempts at revocable
gifts.6
A point of difference should be noted between these two cases. Consider-
ing the Blanchard case as involving a gift of a chose in action, it should be
observed that the donor would have recovered the identical property that
'43 Cal. App. 145, 187 Pac. 35 (1919).
It might be objected that neither of these cases really involved a gift inter vivos; that in
each case, the intenfion of the parties was effectuated through the instrumentality of con-
tract rather than gift. The simplest answer to this objection, however, is that in each opin-
ion the court made it clear that it was sustaining the transaction on a gift rather than a
contract theory; neither court felt that any principle of the law of gifts prevented the donor
from retaining the type of power of revocation involved.
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was the subject matter of the gift if she had chosen to exercise her reserved
power; whereas in the VanHorne case, where the subject matter of the gift
was money, the donor could not hope to recover the identical property given
to the donee. Despite this difference, however, it is clear that each donor
achieved her basic purpose and retained her pre-eminence until her death.
For the purposes of this study, any gift will be considered revocable if its
economic result can be undone by the donor at his caprice at any time before
his death. The fact that the donor might not be able to reclaim the same
property that was given away is thus immaterial if the law permits him to
deprive the donee of the economic benefit and revest it in himself at his
whim. Clearly the purposes of those who make revocable gifts are effec-
tuated almost as well when they are thus able to undo the economic result
of the transaction as they are when they are permitted to reclaim the specific
property.
PART II: CAUSA MoRms Girs
The clearest illustration of a valid, non-trust revocable gift of personal prop-
erty in Anglo-American law is the gift causa mortis. Schouler defined such
gifts as gifts:
of personal property, made by a party in the expectation of death then immi-
nent, and upon the essential condition that the property shall belong fully to
the donee, in case the donor dies as anticipated, leaving the donee surviving
him, and the gift is not meantime revoked, but not otherwise.'
From this definition, it can be seen that the causa mortis gift is subject to
three possibilities of revocation; the gift is revoked if 1) the donor survives
the illness or peril that threatened him when the gift was made,2 2) the do-
nee dies before the donor,3 or 3) the donor, before his death and for any
12 ScHouLER, PERSONAL PROPERTY 134 (3d ed. 1886).
sThe better rule allows the gift to stand even though the donor dies from some peril
other than the one contemplated provided death comes before he recovers from, or survives,
the original peril. See In re Reh, 196 Mich. 210, 162 N.W. 978 (1904); Ridden v. Thrall, 125
N.Y 572, 26 N.E. 627 (1891); In re Presender's Estate, 285 App. Div. 109, 135 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1954); Thomas v. First Nat. Bank, 166 Va. 497, 186 S.E. 77 (1936); BROWN, PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY § 55 (2d ed. 1955); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 735 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960). Some courts, how-
ever, hold the gift revoked whenever the donor does not die of the exact peril contemplated
when it was made. See Ellsworth v. Comes, 204 Ark. 756, 165 S.W.2d 57 (1942); Brind v.
International Trust Co., 66 Colo. 60, 179 Pac. 148 (1919); Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175, 39
Am. Rep. 368 (1880); Blazo v. Cochrane, 71 N.H. 585, 53 Ad. 1026 (1902).
'No American case involving this drcumstance has been found, but statutes in some
states provide that causa mortis gifts are revoked "by the occurrence of any event which
would operate as a revocation of a will made at the same time." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1151; RE-
VISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 67-1711; N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN § 47-11-11 (1960); S.D.C.
51.1510 (1939). See also BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 55 (2d ed. 1955); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 7.36
(Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960).
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reason he deems fit, manifests an intention that the gift shall stand revoked. 4
It is important to note that these three possibilities of revocation are "es-
sential" conditions of such gifts. They inhere in all causa mortis gifts; for
they are attached to the transaction by law and there is no need for the do-
nor, when making the gift, to expressly mention them as conditions of it.
All gifts made by one in apprehension of death from a proximate and im-
pending peril are presumed to be causa mortis and thus, subject to the three
possibilities of revocation. 5 Undoubtedly, a donor, even one in extremis, can
make a gift that would not be subject to any possibility of revocation; but
such a gift would be considered inter vivos rather than causa mortis.6 The
presumption that arises from the circumstances of the donor is rebuttable.
Thus if the evidence shows that the donor intended the gift to be irrevocable,
the presumption is rebutted and the transaction is an ordinary inter vivos
gift.7
Undoubtedly, these three conditions of revocation sprung from the tes-
tamentary origin of the causa mortis gift. As the name indicates, these gifts
came into our law from the Roman Law where they were considered in
many respects as legacies.8 They appear to have developed in English law as
testamentary dispositions, judicially created exceptions to the Statute of
Frauds, 9 until the celebrated case of Ward v. Turner.'0 In that case, Lord
Hardwick established the basis for the non-testamentary nature of such gifts
by refusing to recognize a parol declaration of intent as sufficient to imple-
ment one, holding, that for the desired disposition to be effective, the prop-
erty must also be delivered by the donor before his death. Though there is
some dispute about certain types of cases," the general rule today is that a
' Doran v. Doran, 99 Cal. 311, 33 Pac. 929 (1893); Adams v. Atherton, 132 Cal. 164, 64 Pac.
283 (1901); Stout v. McNab, 157 Cal. 356, 107 Pac. 1005 (1910); Jane v. Murphy, 31 111. App.
28 (1889); Weiss v. Fenwick, 111 N.J. Eq. 358, 162 Atl. 609 (1932); Vesburg v. Mallory, 155
Iowa 165, 135 N.W. 577 (1912); Van Wagoner v. Bonnor, 72 N.J. Eq. 143, 65 At. 239 (1906);
Parker v. Marston, 27 Me. 196 (1847); Bliss v. Fosdick, 86 Hun. 162, 33 N.Y.S. 317 (1895);
Steffen v. Davis, 52 S.D. 283, 217 N.W. 221 (1927). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1151; REvISED
CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 67-1711; N. D. CENTURY CODE ANN § 47-11-11 (1960); S.D.C. 51.1510
(1939).
1 Parker v. Marston, 27 Me. 196 (1847); Van Wagoner v. Bonnor, 72 N.J. Eq. 143, 65 Ad.
239 (1906); Weiss v. Fenwick, I11 N.J. Eq. 385, 162 At. 609 (1932); Becker v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 68 Ohio App. 526, 38 N.E2d 610 (1941); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 7.34 (Bowe-Parker Rev.
1960).
1Gilligan v. Lork, 51 Conn. 562 (1884); Prendergast v. Drew, 103 Conn. 88, 130 Atl. 75
(1925); Peck v. Scofield, 186 Mass. 108, 71 N.E. 109 (1904); Newell v. National Bank of
Norwich, 214 App. Div. 331, 212 N.Y.S. 158 (1925). See also Robertson v. Robertson, 147
Ala. 311, 40 So. 104 (1906); Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 S.W. 641 (1895); Keller v.
McConville, 175 Mich. 479, 141 N.W. 652 (1913).
7 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 51 (2d ed. 1955).
'See INsTrruTEs 2.7 pr.
9 See Schouler, Oral Wills and Death-bed Gifts, 2 L. Q. REv. 444 (1886).
102 Ves.Sr. 431 (Ch. 1752).
u There is a split of authority on whether or not a causa mortis gift can be accomplished
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causa mortis gift must be accomplished by such an act of delivery as would
have been sufficient to sustain the transaction had it been an ordinary, inter
vivos gift.' 2
The non-testamentary nature of causa mortis gifts in American law was
established, and the theory of their operation was well set forth, in the early
case of Nicholas v. Adams.18 The trial court had held a causa mortis gift re-
voked merely because the donor had executed a will after having made the
donation. 14 The appellate court reversed, saying that the lower court had
erred because of its "notion that this species of donation is to be treated not
as a gift inter vivos, but as a testamentary disposition ... taking effect for
the first time at the donor's death .. " The appellate court said that the
gift causa mortis is really an inter vivos transaction and that:
it has no property in common with a legacy, except that it is revocable in the
donor's lifetime, and subject to his debts, in the event of a deficiency. The first
is, not because the gift is testamentary, but because such is the condition an-
nexed to it; and the second, not because it is in the nature of a legacy, but be-
cause it would otherwise be fraudulent as to creditors .... [T]he donee, conse-
quently, takes paramount to the executor or a legatee.
The court went on to explain that the donee's title is paramount because
he receives it from the donor when the act of delivery is performed. Thus,
the property is not a part of the donor's estate at the time of his death and
by deed without a delivery of the property. Compare Knight v. Tripp, 121 Cal. 647, 54 Pac.
267 (1898) and McMahon v. Newton Savings Bank, 67 Conn. 78, 34 At. 709 (1895), with
Meyers v. Meyers, 99 N.J. Eq. 560, 134 At. 95 (1926) and Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591 (1852).
See also BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 46 (2d ed. 1955); Mechem, The Requirement of De-
livery in Gifts, 21 ILL. L. REV. 568, 573 (1927); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 7.14 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960).
Though an intending donor need not repossess property already in the hands of his in-
tended donee in order to make an inter vivos gift, there is considerable authority that he
must recover the property and then redeliver it to his donee in order to make a causa mortis
gift. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45 (2d ed. 1955); Mechem, The Requirement of De-
livery in Gifts, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 368 (1926); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 7.15 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960).
12 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 52 (2d ed. 1955); Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery
in Gifts, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 356 (1926); 1 PAGE, WILLS §§ 7.11, 7.12 (Bowe-Parker Rev.
1960).
182 Whart. 17 (Pa. 1836).
1 It is generally agreed that the mere execution of a will after the making of a causa mortis
gift does not necessarily revoke the gift. See Moore v. Shiflett, 187 Ky. 7, 216 S.W. 614 (1920);
Lumberg v. Commonwealth Bank, 295 Mich. 566, 295 N.W. 266 (1940); Hoehn v. Stuttman,
71 Mo. App. 399 (1897); Merchant v. Merchant, 2 Bradf. 432 (1853). In Jayne v. Murphy, 31
Ill. App. 28 (1889), however, where the will discolsed a clear intention to revoke the gift, the
court held that the gift had been revoked. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1152; REVISED CODES OF
MONTANA, 1947, § 67-1712; N. D. CENTURY CODE ANN. § 47-11-12 (1960); SDC 51.1511 (1939).
The fact that a donor might be permitted to revoke a causa mortis gift by an express provision
in his will does not necessarily mean that the gift is testamentary. See 1 Scor, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956), where the analagous problem with respect to revocable trusts
is discussed.
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his executor and legatees cannot succeed to it. The donee's title is not abso-
lute when received; for until the donor dies it is "defeasible by reclamation,
the contingency of survivorship, or deliverance from the peril." But when
the donor dies, it is no longer possible that any of the three defeating events
might occur and the donee's title then becomes absolute. 15 This is the view
that most American courts take of causa mortis gifts. Under it, the gift is the
transfer of a qualified title to the donee. Since this is fully executed before
the donor dies, the transaction is clearly inter vivos and not testamentary.
The donor's death is significant neither as the event upon which the gift be-
comes executed, nor as the event upon which the donee receives his title, but
only as the event upon which the donee's qualified title becomes absolute.
Not all courts, however, have adopted this theory of causa mortis gifts.
In Hatcher v. Buford,16 the court held that the causa mortis donee receives
no title whatsoever until the donor dies. Under this view, the donor retains
full title to the property until his death when it passes for the first time to
the donee. Though the court appeared to argue that such a theory did not
render the transaction testamentary, its reasoning seems to more logically
lead to the conclusion that, though the gift is testamentary, it is exempt
from the formality requirements of the Statute of Wills because it is suffi-
ciently evidenced by the act of delivery. To say that a gift that passes no in-
terest in the property to the donee until the donor has died is not testamen-
tary, places an impossible burden on our notion of the distinction between
inter vivos and testamentary transfers.
Though the theory of causa mortis gifts adopted by the Hatcher case is
believed to be unfortunate,17 it can be found in several other cases, generally
by way of dicta.' 8 The distinction between the two theories is frequently
phrased in terms of whether the donor's death is viewed as a condition prec-
edent or as a condition subsequent. If the majority theory is followed, death
is said to be a condition subsequent; and if the minority theory is followed,
death is said to be a condition precedent. Clearly, all that these phrases mean
in this context is that death is an event which, under the majority theory,
occurs after title has passed to the donee (subsequent to the gift) and which
1"The title to a gift causa mortis passes by the delivery, defeasible only in the lifetime
of the donor, and his death perfects the title in the donee by terminating the donor's right
or power of defeasance." Emery v. Clough, 63 N.H. 552, 4 At. 796 (1885).
1660 Ark. 169, 29 S.W. 641 (1895).
17 The Hatcher case held that the widow of a deceased causa mortis donor could assert a
"dower" claim against the subject matter of the gift. The court could have justified this
conclusion on the basis of policy without repudiating the usual theory of causa mortis gifts.
See Railey v. Railey, 30 F.Supp. 121 (D.D.C. 1939).
"Wilson v. Wilson, 211 Ark. 1030, 204 S.W.2d 479 (1947); Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn.
480 (1835); Borthwick v. Skurzynski, 139 N.J. Eq. 520, 52 A.2d 443, aff'd, 141 N.J. Eq. 363,
57 A.2d 216 (1948); In re Nol's Estate, 251 Wisc. 90, 28 N.W.2d 360 (1947).
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merely serves to make that title absolute; and which, under the minority
theory, occurs before any title whatsoever passes to the donee (precedent
to the gift). The phrases describe only the time at which the donee is con-
ceived to have received his title and are not primarily concerned with the
nature of that title, i.e., whether present or future, vested or contingent. The
distinction is between conditions that are precedent and those that are sub-
sequent to the gift itself and not the technical distinction between condi-
tions that are precedent or subsequent to the vesting of title.
Unfortunately, the courts have not always recognized the true meaning
of these phrases. Confusion is frequently found in cases where the donor has
expressed the condition of his death at the time of making the gift and the
court is called upon to determine the validity of the transaction. In such
cases, some courts seem to feel that the gift cannot be sustained under the
majority theory if the condition is expressed in the form of a technical con-
dition precedent. This error is noticeable in Estate of Nols,19 where when
delivering the property to the donee the donor said, "if I don't come back
[from the hospital], you can have it." The court was unwilling to hold the
gift void for it felt that few laymen would express the condition of their
death in any other manner. Since the court felt that it could not sustain the
gift under the majority theory, it adopted the minority view. It is submitted,
however, that the gift could have been sustained under the majority theory.
Indeed, similar language was used to express the donative intent in Nich-
olas v. Adams,2 0 which established the inter vivos character of causa mortis
gifts. At no place in its opinion did the court in the Nicholas case bother to
determine whether the condition expressed was precedent or subsequent
to the vesting of the donee's title. The court did, however, say that the con-
dition was valid, stressing that the contingency did not affect the passage of
title but merely its perfection, i.e., its becoming absolute.
Basket v. Hassell2' is generally cited as establishing the rule to be applied
under the majority theory in determining the validity of causa mortis gifts
where the donor has expressed the condition of his death. In this case, a man
owned a negotiable certificate of deposit which was payable on demand.
During his last illness and while in apprehension of death, the man indorsed
the certificate as follows: "Pay to Martin Basket, of Henderson, Ky.; no one
else; then not till my death. My life seems to be uncertain. I may live through
this spell. Then I will attend to it myself." He then gave the certificate to
Basket. The man subsequently died and the court was called upon to de-
termine the ownership of the deposit. The court held that the attempted
19251 Wisc. 90, 28 N.W.2d 360 (1947).
20Supra note 13.
107 U.S. 602 (1883).
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gift was ineffective. Concededly, there is much language in the opinion that
seems to indicate that the court intended to draw simply the technical dis-
tinction between conditions that are precedent and those that are subse-
quent to the vesting of the donee's title. But the outcome of the case is clearly
predicated upon the fact that the court found the transaction to be an at-
tempted testamentary disposition and, as such, that it could not qualify as a
valid causa mortis gift. Since the distinction between conditions precedent
and subsequent to the vesting of title is usually immaterial in determining
whether or not a transaction is testamentary,2 2 we should be slow in conclud-
ing that this was the distinction intended.
The court held that the indorsement on the certificate of deposit rendered
the delivery ineffective.
[A] delivery which does not confer upon the donee the present right to reduce
the fund into possession by enforcing the obligation, according to its terms, will
not suffice. A delivery, in terms, which confers upon the donee power to con-
trol the fund only after the death of the donor, when by the instrument itself
it is presently payable, is testamentary in character, and not good as a gift.
Thus, in the eyes of the court, reduction of the fund to the donee's posses-
sion was essential for a valid delivery.23 But the indorsement on the certificate
of deposit precluded such reduction to possession until the donor had died.
Thus the donor had made his death an event that had to occur before one
of the essential elements of all valid gifts-the act of delivery-could be com-
pleted; he had made his death a condition precedent to the gift itself. Clearly
this is the important element in the case. The court was not faced with a
donee who had received a contingent interest during the donor's lifetime;
it was faced by a donee who in its eyes had received no interest whatsoever.
Clearly such a transaction is testamentary and cannot be harmonized with
the majority theory. Thus it is submitted, the true holding of the case is
simply this: When the donor makes his death a condition precedent to the
delivery, when he so manipulates the transaction that the act of delivery
cannot be completed until his death, then his death is a condition precedent
to the gift and the transaction is testamentary and cannot, under the ma-
jority theory, be a valid causa mortis gift. Certainly, this holding does not
2 See 1 PAGE, WILLS § 6.1 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960); 1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw
OF REAL PROPERTY § 32 (1947).
It is possible to argue with the court on this point. This was an attempted gift of the
chose, not of the money. The manual tradition of the document representing the chose, even
though so indorsed, could be considered a valid delivery. See Smith v. Eshelman, 235 Ala.
588, 180 So. 313 (1938); Connelly v. Bank of America, 138 Cal. App. 2d 303, 291 P.2d 501
(1956); Buchman v. Smith, 137 N.J. Eq. 215, 44 A.2d 179 (1945); Parker v. Mott, 181 N.C.
485, 107 S.E. 500 (1921); Hoks v. Wollenberg, 209 Wisc. 276, 243 N.W. 218, 245 N.W. 128
(1932).
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condemn gifts which are executed during the donor's lifetime by the pas-
sage of some interest in the property to the donee, even though that interest
might be contingent.
The distinction between conditions which are precedent to the gift and
those which are precedent merely to the perfecting of the donee's title is ra-
ther fine but it is submitted that it is valid. It is similar to the distinction
currently drawn in the field of trusts to explain why some attempts at re-
vocable trusts are testamentary while others are not. The Reporter's Notes
to the new edition of the Restatement of Trusts state:
There is a difference between the situation where the death of the settlor is a
condition precedent to the creation of a trust, and the situation where the
trust is created during the lifetime of the settlor, although he reserves power to
revoke it. In the former case no trust is created unless the requirements for the
execution of a will are complied with. . . . In the latter case the trust is not
testamentary .... 24
Of course, the settlor's power of revocation in a trust is not a condition, and
therefore the analogy is not perfect. Yet conditions and powers are similar
in that both render the estate subject to them defeasible and thus prevent it,
at least for a time, from being absolute. And the conditions of revocation in
a causa mortis gift and the power of revocation in a trust are further similar
in that each is generally extinguished upon the death of the donor or settlor
respectively.25 It is submitted that just as it is possible to distinguish between
conditions precedent to the creation of a trust and the reserved power which
qualifies the cestui's title rendering the trust revocable, in the same manner
it is also possible to distinguish between conditions precedent to the mak-
ing of a causa mortis gift and the conditions which qualify the donee's title
rendering such gifts revocable. And it is further submitted that the majority
rule prohibiting the donor from making his death a condition precedent is
designed merely to embody this distinction and to indicate that the same
result flows from it in the gift case as in the trust case: 26 if the donor's death
is a condition precedent to the gift, then the transaction is testamentary
and cannot qualify as a causa mortis gift; whereas if the donor's death is
213 REATEMENT, TRUsTs, Appendix at 111 (2d ed. 1959).
Concerning revocation by will of donor or settlor, see supra note 14.
This is the only logical basis for the rule. It must discover some basic defect in the
transaction that prevents the court from giving it effect. It cannot be designed simply to
identify the technical nature of the condition imposed by law and to indicate that all con-
ditions expressed by the parties must be identical to it; for there are many cases that demon-
strate that donors can annex conditions that materially differ from those implied by law
without impairing the validity of the gift. Thus it is not unusual for a donor to condition a
causa mortis gift on the payment of his debts and funeral expenses. See, e.g., Smith v. Eshel-
man, 235 Ala. 588, 180 So. 313 (1938); Smith v. Clark, 219 Ark. 751, 244 S.W.2d 776 (1952);
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subsequent to the gift, then (regardless of the technical nature of the donee's
title) the transaction is inter vivos and valid.
A donor might make his death a condition precedent to the gift in either
of two ways: 1) as in Basket v. Hassell,27 by so manipulating the transaction
that the act which the court deems essential for a valid delivery cannot be
completed until he dies; and 2) by so qualifying his donative intent that he
indicates that the transaction is not to be effective until his death. Cases of
the first group present no serious difficulty. The greatest problem in them is
determining what acts are essential for a valid delivery. Once this issue is
resolved, it is an easy matter to determine whether the required act was per-
formed before or after the donor's death. Cases of the second group, how-
ever, are troublesome. Unlike the acts of delivery, intent is a subjective thing
and it is difficult to tell when it has been improperly qualified. This is the
real difficulty in such cases as Estate of NoIs,28 where the donor expresses his
intent in such terms as "This is yours if I die." A literal reading of the lan-
guage indicates that the donor's death is a condition precedent to the gift;
it seems to indicate that the donor had no present donative intent, that he
intended the gift to be effective only in the event of, and at the moment of,
his death. However, we must realize that the distinction between a disposi-
tion to take effect only on the death of the donor and one to take effect im-
mediately but subject to revocation by the donor at any time before his
death, is difficult even for the trained legal mind to make. In such circum-
stances, we should be slow in attempting to determine which of these in-
tents a layman had merely on the basis of the chance phrase he used to ex-
press it. We should also consider his actions. And the most significant act
performed is the act of delivery-the unqualified surrender of physical con-
trol over the property itself. Should not this act be construed as the expres-
sion of the donor's intent, "Here, I presently give this property to you." The
words actually used can then be construed to mean, "It shall be yours abso-
lutely if I die, but if I recover I want it back." Viewed in this light, it is clear
that the donor has not improperly qualified his donative intent and that
his death is not a condition precedent to the gift; it is merely a condition
precedent to the perfecting of the donee's title.2 9
Knight v. Tripp, 121 Cal. 675, 54 Pac. 267 (1898); Reynolds v. Maust, 142 Pa. Super. 109, 15
A.2d 853 (1940). And in Woodburn v. Woodburn, 123 Ill. 608, 14 N.E. 58 (1887), such a gift
was upheld even though conditioned on the donee's refraining to contest the will of the
donor. See also Currie v. Steele, 4 N.Y. Super. 542 (1849).
z Supra note 21.
" Supra note 19.
2 Many cases have held causa mortis gifts valid even though the donative intent was ex-
pressed in terms of "if I die." See Smith v. Eshelman, 235 Ala. 588, 180 So. 313 (1938); Canon
v. Williams, 194 Ga. 808, 22 S.E.2d 838 (1942); Adcock v. Bishop, 309 Ky. 502, 218 S.W.2d 52
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It is submitted that the rule prohibiting the donor from making his death
a condition precedent should be applied more as a negative than as an af-
firmative requirement in this second group of cases. It should be permit-
ted to strike down only those gifts in which there is affirmative evidence that
the donor intended the transaction not to be effective until his death. The
acts of delivery are of such a character that they should give rise to a pre-
sumption that the donor's intent was not improperly qualified; 80 and this
presumption should be overcome only by affirmative evidence to the con-
trary, e.g., where the donor states that the gift is not to be effective until he
consults an adviser and he dies before such consultation, or where the donee
or the property is not identified until his death.8 1 Generally, this is the way
that the rule is applied in the trust cases;82 it would, moreover, lead to sub-
stantially the same result advocated by Professor Brown who argued that
the rule should be ignored in all cases where "there is an actual delivery of
the subject matter, and the intent of the donor to make some gratuitous
disposition of his property is clearly proven."88
It sometimes seems to be felt that the majority rule prevents the donor
from restricting the donee's use of the property during the interval between
the making of the gift and the donor's death. Indeed, though not expressly
so stated, this seems to have been another of the reasons why the Wisconsin
court felt that it had to adopt the minority rule in order to sustain the gift
in Estate of Nols. Looking at all the circumstances of the transaction, the
court apparently concluded that the decedent had not intended the donee
to begin enjoying the property immediately and felt that this conclusion
could not be harmonized with the majority rule. It is submitted, however,
that a restriction on the donee's right of immediate enjoyment does not
necessarily mean that the donor intended the donee to receive no title when
the transaction was entered into; it can merely indicate that the title trans-
ferred was a future, and not a possessory, interest. Though gifts of future
interests raise peculiar problems of delivery, it is now clear that a donor may
make a valid inter vivos gift while reserving a life estate in himself.85 Though
(1949); Meyers v. Meyers, 99 N.J. Eq. 560, 134 At. 95 (1926); In re Hennessy's Estate, 253
App. Div. 6, 300 N.Y.S. 766 (1937); In re Spiegel's Will, 175 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sur. 1958); Titus-
ville Trust Co. v. Johnson, 375 Pa. 493, 100 A.2d 93 (1953); In re Van Wormer's Estate, 255
Mich. 399, 238 N.W. 210 (1931); Lumberg v. Commonwealth Bank, 295 Mich. 566, 295
N.W. 266 (1940); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 105 S.C. 459, 90 S.E. 34 (1916); Hoks v. Wollenberg, 209
Wisc. 276, 243 N.W. 219 (1952).
See infra, Part Ill.
" In Yates v. Dundas, 80 Cal.App.2d 468, 182 P.2d 305 (1947) and In re Anderson's Estate,
180 Misc. 827, 46 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1943), attempted causa mortis gifts of property to be ac-
quired in the future were held ineffective.
u See 1 Soorr, THE LAw OF TRusTs §§ 26, 32, 56 (2d ed. 1956).
0 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 53 (2d ed. 1955).
81See Note, 1948 Wis. L. Rzv. 112, 115.
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the donee in such a case must await his donor's death to fully enjoy the
property, the gift is immediately effective to create a future interest in him
and thus, it is not a testamentary transaction. Though authority discussing
the matter is slight, there is no logical reason why a causa mortis donor may
not do the same.3 0 So long as the transaction is immediately effective in in-
terest, so long as the donor does not make his death a condition precedent
to the passage of title to the donee, the gift is not testamentary and should
be valid.37
Though the revocable character of causa mortis gifts is well established,
they offer little aid to the prospective donor who is seeking a means of pre-
serving his pre-eminence. Their use for this purpose is seriously curtailed
by the fact that they can be made only by those in apprehension of death
from a proximate and impending peril.38 Most of the gifts that have been
sustained involved donors who were in failing health at the time of the gift
or who were about to undergo surgery. The ordinary, healthy donor must
seek some other means of preserving his pre-eminence.
PART III: CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT OF DELIVERY
There are statements in innumerable American cases that seem to preclude
the possibility of any type of a valid revocable gift inter vivos. In a recent
twenty year period, over two hundred such cases were found. Upon exam-
ination, however, it was discovered that the vast majority of these statements
were clear dicta; the facts recited in most of the opinions disclosed no at-
tempt by either of the parties to make the gift in any way revocable and the
courts were merely parroting from earlier decisions broad statements con-
cerning the requisites of valid gifts. Most of the remaining cases announced
rules of irrevocability which, it is felt, do not preclude all possibility of any
type of a valid revocable gift.
At the outset, it should be noted that the attribute of irrevocability may
be ascribed to the donative transaction with a variety of meanings. In the
first place, gifts may be said to be irrevocable merely to indicate that once
the transaction is completed, it is just as final and binding upon the parties
as a transfer supported by consideration; in other words, that once the trans-
SSee infra, Part IV.
See 1 SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 447 (2d ed. 1956).
Without alluding to what they were doing, many courts have sustained causa mortis
gifts in which the donors seem to have reserved life estates in themselves. See Fender v. Foust,
82 Mont. 73, 265 Pac. 15 (1928); Buckman v. Smith, 137 N.J. Eq. 215, 44 A.2d 179 (1945);
In re Spiegel's Will, 175 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sur. 1958); Parker v. Mott, 181 N.C. 485, 107 S.E. 500
(1921); In re Newland's Estate, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 246, 70 N.E.2d 234, aff'd, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 252,
70 N.E.2d 238 (1946); Hoks v. Wollenberg, 209 Wisc. 276, 243 N.W. 219 (1932).
'Smith v. Clark, 219 Ark. 751, 244 S.W.2d 776 (1952); Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barb. 370
(N.Y. 1867).
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action is completed, the donor cannot change his mind and reclaim the
property merely because the transfer was gratuitous.1 This characteristic of
gifts inter vivos is commonplace to the modern American mind but it should
be realized that such irrevocability is not essential to a systematic law of
gifts nor was its general acceptance in Anglo-American Law always as free
from doubt as it is today. The Code of Justinian provided for the revoca-
tion of gifts if the donee proved to be ungrateful.2 This doctrine of ingrati-
tude has been carried into most civil law systems3 but it has never been adopt-
ed by the common law.4 It has, however, at times been argued in the United
States that gifts should be revocable if improvident when made.5 And, of
course, the causa mortis gift is per se revocable by the donor at his whim; 6
and in some states, gratuitous trusts are presumed to be revocable in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary.7 It seems clear that some of the statements
to the effect that gifts inter vivos are irrevocable were designed simply to
convey the idea that in the common law such transfers, unlike causa mortis
giftss and civil law donations, are just as binding and efficacious as transfers
supported by consideration.
Irrevocability can also be spoken of when attempting to define the ele-
ment of donative intent. The word, give, is ambiguous and is not restricted
in meaning to the designation of gratuitous transfers; thus we frequently
speak of "giving" a deed to a grantee even though he might have paid con-
sideration therefor. When a man is on his way to the swimming pool and
he "gives" his watch to his friend, how do we determine whether this is a
I When read in its full context, this clearly is the true meaning of the passage, so fre-
quently cited from Blackstone, that "it is not in the donor's power to retract [a true and
proper gift]." See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0441.
2 CODE 7.56.
'See 4 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 174 (1959). See also L.A. R. C. C. Art. 1559 (1870).
' See however the following statement from James v. Aller, 66 N.J. Eq. 52, 57 Atd. 476 (1904),
reversed in 68 N.J. Eq. 666, 62 Atd. 427 (1905):
[I]n relation to gifts made by a parent to a child, and made under the influence of the
confidence and trust arising from that relation, the further question always arises
whether the character and circumstances of the gift are such as to impose a duty
toward the donor on the conscience of the donee who claims that the gift is irrevocable.
See also Crans v. Kroger, 22 I11. 74 (1859).
'Soberanes v. Soberanes, 97 Cal. 140, 31 Pac. 910 (1893); Maier v. Hill, 221 Miss. 120, 70
So. 2d 209 (1954); Appeal of Rick, 105 Pa. St. 528 (1884).
"See supra, Part II.
ICAL. CIv. CODE § 2280; OKLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.41 (1963); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
art. 7425b-41 (1960). See also 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 998 (1962).
8 There are statutes in several states that rather ineptly codify this distinction between
gifts inter vivos and gifts causa mortis by providing: "A gift, other than a gift in view of
death, cannot be revoked by the giver." CAL. CiV. CODE § 1148; REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,
1947, § 67-1708; N. D. CENTURY CODE ANN. § 47-11-08 (1960); SDC 51.1508 (1939). The
phrasing of these statutes seems to clearly indicate that they were designed not to prohibit
revocable gifts but merely to indicate that, unlike causa mortis gifts, inter vivos gifts are
not per se revocable. See Murdock v. Murdock, 49 Cal. App. 775, 194 Pac. 762 (1920).
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gift or a bailment for safe-keeping? Clearly, the solution lies in the intent of
the parties. In such cases, the easiest way to express the difference between
these two possible intents is to phrase it in terms of the absoluteness of the
transfer. If the swimmer intended to reclaim the watch when he returned
from the pool-if he intended, in a sense, to revoke the transfer-then it is a
bailment; but if he did not so intend to reclaim the property, then it is gift.
Many cases speak of irrevocability as an essential of the gift transaction
merely to explain this aspect of the donative intent.9 But clearly, revocability
is not the essence of the distinction; for property can be entrusted to a bailee
or agent even though the owner does not want the property returned to
him10 and, conversely, a gift can be made even though the donor intends to be
able to reclaim the property upon certain contingencies.1
Though these two attributes of irrevocability are reasonably easy to rec-
ognize and explain in gift transactions, courts frequently speak of irrevo-
cability as a necessary ingredient of gifts in another, more abstruse, sense.
Some courts have used the term when describing the necessary act of deliv-
ery; others, in connection with the requirement of a present donative in-
tent. Few of these courts have explained exactly what they meant by their
use of the term and the resultant ambiguity has led to the impression that
any element of revocability in a donative transaction is fatal to its validity.
It is submitted, however, that though there are certain aspects of both the
delivery and the intent that must be irrevocable, precedent does not require
so broad a rule as to preclude the possibility of any type of revocable gift.
The rest of this section and all of the next will be devoted to an examination
of the cases to determine precisely wherein the delivery and the intent must
be irrevocable and the suggestion of a type of revocable gift that satisfies
these requirements and which is therefore felt to be possible. The cases ac-
tually involving this type of gift will be developed in Part V.
The requirement of delivery in gifts of personal property is complex and
difficult of being accurately phrased in the form of a general rule that can be
9See Shewmaker v. Shifflett, 205 Ark. 875, 171 S.W.2d 309 (1943); Carlson v. Carlson, 224
Ark. 284, 273 S.W.2d 542 (1954); Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Gray, 53 R.I. 377, 166 At.
817 (1933); Zorich v. Zorich, 119 Ind. App. 547, 88 N.E.2d 694 (1949); Krause v. Krause, 235
Ind. 325, 132 N.E.2d 608 (1956); Brashears' Adm'r. v. Oder, 291 Ky. 817, 165 S.W.2d 801
(1942); Rinehart v. Rinehart, 14 Ill. App.2d 116, 143 N.E.2d 398 (1957); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
137 N.J. Eq. 557, 46 A.2d 85 (1946); Frick v. Cone, 160 Misc. 450, 290 N.Y.S. 592, aff'd, 251
App. Div. 781, 298 N.Y.S. 176 (1936); Pizer's Estate, 178 Misc. 7, 32 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1941); In re
Dobish's Will, 98 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sur. 1950); Duboff v. Duboff, 186 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Hickman v. Barrett, 175 Okla. 262, 52 P.2d 40 (1936); Jeffords v. Poor, 115 Vt. 147, 55
A.2d 605 (1947). See also Watkins v. Hodge, 232 S.C. 245, 101 S.E.2d 657 (1958), and com-
pare it with Scot v. Haughton, 2 Vern. 560, 23 Eng.Rep. 963 (1706).
10 E.g., a delivery into the custody of a servant for the purpose of making a future delivery
to a donee; a bailment for sale, see BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 79 (2d ed. 1955).
"E.g., a gift in con:emplation of marriage, see Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 579 (1952).
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applied to all cases. Courts generally define it as the act whereby the donor
intentionally relinquishes dominion and control of the subject of the gift
to the donee.12 Though this definition has proven useful as a means of gen-
eralizing the results of many gift cases, it is important to realize that it does
not specify the type of dominion and control that the donor must surrender.
Physical power over the res? Jural powers through the exercise of which the
res can in any way be affected? Or some combination of both?
In the case of chattels that are capable of passing out of the possession of
the donor and into that of the donee, the courts usually require this to be
done. Thus in Hamilton's Estate,13 the court held an attempted gift of a
piece of jewelry ineffective even though the donor had verbally manifested
a donative intent because the donor did not surrender possession of the
broach to the donee. And similarly, in Young v. Locknit,14 the court held an
attempted gift of a table ineffective because after verbally expressing dona-
tive intent, the donor insisted that the table remain in his house until his
sister died. The donor died before the sister and while the table was still
in the house. The purported donee sued in trover for the table and the court
held that no gift had been made. In the course of its opinion, the court said:
In the instant case the evidence fails to show any delivery, actual or symbolical,
that put it beyond the power of the donor to revoke the gift.
Clearly, both cases were properly decided. But the statement of the rule of
delivery in the latter case leaves something to be desired. Clearly the court
held the gift void because of a defect in the delivery; yet the court seems to
say that no gift is valid if the donor has any power of revocation after the
delivery; that the delivery must destroy all possibility of revocation.
That the requirement of delivery is not so restrictive seems obvious from
cases involving gifts causa mortis. With certain exceptions not here material, 15
courts usually agree that the delivery necessary to sustain a gift causa mortis
is the same as that required in gifts inter vivos. That the requirement men-
tioned in the Hamilton and the Young cases is necessary in causa mortis
gifts is clear from such cases as Genteman v. Sutter,16 where the court said:
The delivery of a gift causa mortis must be such as would invest the donee with
title in case of a gift inter vivos. ... . The test of delivery is: "Has the delivery of
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 39 (2d ed. 1955).
1826 Wash. 2d 363, 174 P.2d 301 (1946).
1,64 Ga. App. 438, 13 S.E.2d 525 (1941).
The delivery requirement of causa mortis gifts might differ from that of inter vivos
gifts in two types of cases: 1) where the donee is in possession of the subject matter before
the gift is attempted, and 2) where the gift is attempted to be effectuated by a deed without
a delivery of the property. See supra, Part 11.
18 358 Mo. 476, 215 S.W.2d 477 (1948); see also Trask v. Arcadia Valley Bank, 230 S.W.2d
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possession been such as to put it out of the power of the donor to repossess the
property?"
Clearly, the court could not have meant that the delivery to be valid must
somehow destroy all possibility of revocation. For if such were the rule then
no causa mortis gift would be possible; in causa mortis gifts, the donor al-
ways has the power to revoke for any reason he sees fit at any time before he
dies.
That this requirement of delivery in gifts does not always preclude the
donor from retaining a power of revocation also seems evidenced by many
trust cases. When a trust is attempted to be established by a transfer in trust,
as distinguished from a declaration of trust, the validity of the transaction
frequently depends upon the effectiveness of the transfer of settlor's title
to the trustee.' 7 The validity of this transfer is judged not by any peculiar
rule of the law of trusts but rather by the general principles applicable to
any other transfer of title;' 8 frequently, it is judged by the law of gifts.' 9 Thus
in Kerwin's Estate,20 where an attempted charitable trust was held void be-
cause the settlor had failed to effectively transfer title of the res to the trustee,
the court said:
In order to effectuate an inter vivos gift there must be evidence of an intention
to make a gift and a delivery, actual or constructive, of a nature sufficient not only
to divest the donor of all dominion over the property but also invest the donee
with complete control over the subject-matter of the gift.21
Clearly the court. was merely reciting the requirement of delivery that was
the basis of the decisions in the Hamilton and Young cases. Yet clearly this
requirement does not prevent the settlor from reserving a power of revoca-
tion for it is quite clear that revocable trusts are valid whether accomplished
by declaration or transfer.22
Though it thus seems clear that the requirement of delivery does not al-
ways prevent a donor from retaining a power of revocation, it is difficult to
determine when such retained control is permissible and when it is pro-
501 (Mo. 1950); California Trust Co. v. Bennett, 189 P.2d 531 (Cal. App. 1948), afl'd, 33
Cal. 2d 694, 204 P.2d 324 (1949).
It 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 32 (2d ed. 1959).
as Landon v. Hutton, 50 N.J. Eq. 500, 25 At. 953 (1892).
"See 1 ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 32.2 (2d ed. 1956).
10 371 Pa. 147, 89 A.2d 332 (1952).
See also Williams v. Anderson, 288 Ill. App. 149, 5 N.E.2d 593 (1936):
Both classes of gifts [gifts inter vivos and gifts in trust] which are not of a testamentary
kind, must be completed and executed in the lifetime of the donor beyond his power of
recall, by a transfer of the possession and legal title to the trustee, or donee.
1 ScoTt, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956).
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hibited. In the cases discussed above, it seems clear that all that the courts
were trying to say was that the donor should have put the property beyond
his physical power to retake. Though the language used in many of the opin-
ions is broader, it is clear that each attempted gift failed simply because the
donor insisted on retaining physical control over the res. This is merely an
application to the peculiar facts of these cases of the rule of delivery by man-
ual tradition, which is required in some but not all types of gifts. The es-
sence of delivery by manual tradition is the transfer of possession from one
person to another.2 Possession, however, is a factual. question dependent
in large measure upon the physical relationship between the individual and
the thing: generally the person in physical control of an object is considered
as having possession of it.24 Thus unless the donor surrenders his physical
control, he retains possession and there can be no delivery by manual tra-
dition.
Many of the statements to the effect that gifts must be irrevocable come
from cases in which the intending donor failed to part with physical control
of the object of the gift.25 Clearly these are sound cases. But clearly also, it
is wrong to generalize them into a rule which recites that delivery requires
the donor to forego every type of control that might result in a revocable
gift. They are wholly unresponsive to the type of revocable gift attempted in
Gould v. VanHorne,26 where the donor surrendered complete physical con-
trol over the money but retained a bare legal right through the exercise of
which she could compel the donee to repay an equal sum to her. Indeed, it
seems doubtful that the vast majority of cases where the donor refuses to
part with his physical control should be considered attempts at revocable
gifts at all. The facts of these cases usually indicate no expression by the
donor of an intention to make a revocable gift. True, while verbally express-
ing his donative intent, his conduct indicates that he probably intended to
be able to free himself from the transaction and use the property for his own
benefit. But it is submitted that this conduct rather than manifesting an in-
tent to make a revocable gift, indicates that the donor has not yet formed a
final, definite intent to enter into a legal transaction. By retaining physical
11 BROWN, PER.SoNA.L PROPERTY § 39 (2d ed. 1955).
" BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 21 (2d ed. 1955).
2 DeMouy v. Jepson, 255 Ala. 337,51 So. 2d 506 (1951); Rolinson v. Rolinson, 132 Cal. App.
2d 387, 282 P.2d 98 (1955); Garrell v. Nicholson, 119 Ga. 458, 46 S.E. 623 (1904); Pope v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 163 Md. 239, 161 At. 404 (1932); Monaghan v. Monaghan, 320 Mass.
367, 67 N.E.2d 476 (1946); Kobrosky v. Crystall, 332 Mass. 452, 125 N.E. 2d 385 (1955); Chad-
dock v. Chaddock, 134 Mich. 48, 95 N.W. 972 (1903); Cooney v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 235 Minn. 377, 51 N.W.2d 258 (1952); Bockman v. KeIm, 117 F. Supp. 478 (D.C.
Minn. 1954); Harmon v. Kerns, 169 Okla. 290, 36 P.2d 898 (1934); Chadrow v. Kellman,
378 Pa. 237, 106 A.2d 594 (1954); Pamplin v. Satterfield, 196 Tenn. 297, 265 S.W.2d 886
(1954); Wells v. Sansing, 151 Tex. 36, 245 S.W.2d 964 (1952).
" 43 Cal. App. 145. 187 Pac. 35 (1919), discussed supra in Part I.
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power over the res, by retaining the ability to "revoke" through self-help
rather than some juridical procedure, the donor indicates that he is still
contemplating the wisdom of entering into the transaction. This intent
should be distinguished from that of a donor who has finally determined to
make the gift, to enter into the transaction and submit its operation to legal
rules and juridical procedures, but who has reserved a bare legal right to
recover the property for his own use if some future event indicates the wis-
dom or necessity of this course of action.
While stressing the element of physical control, we cannot completely
lose sight of the role certain types of legal rights play in some cases. The law
does not recognize the practical differences in control that might result from
the varying physical abilities of individuals. We have advanced beyond the
law of the jungle. Thus there is no doubt that a baby has possession of his
candy even though a bully might be physically able to control it. This limi-
tation upon the element of physical control has been formulated into the
rule that one has sufficient control to have possession "when others cannot
interfere with [his] control of the object without violation of some inde-
pendent right of [his] either of person or property. ' 27 The baby has posses-
sion of the candy because the bully would interfere with his right of person
in taking it from him.
Though this limitation upon the necessity of surrendering physical con-
trol has generally been recognized and applied in gift cases, 28 there is a some-
what similar rule that has frequently been ignored. This rule is that the
person receiving physical control of property may be said to receive pos-
session of it even though another can by asserting an independent legal
right vest in himself the right to immediate possession. Thus it is generally
27BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 22 (2d ed. 1955).
2See Patterson v. Greenboro Loan & Trust Co., 157 N.C. 13, 72 SE. 629 (1911), where a
valid delivery was found in a man's act of placing goldpieces in his grandchild's trunk; the
trunk was kept in the donor's home and was used to store property the child used during
visits. See also the somewhat similar case of In re Tardibone, 196 Misc. 738, 94 N.Y.S.2d
724 (1949). Since the donees in these cases had no idea of the amount of money involved and
since the donor in each case could have recovered some or all of the money without leaving
any evidence of his trespass, it is possible to view these cases as successful attempts at revo-
cable gifts.
Where the independent right of the donee is slight and it is obvious that the donor has
used this means to effectuate the gift so that he could subsequently recover the property for
his own use if he so desired, the courts have held the transaction ineffective. See Falbo v.
U. S. National Bank, 116 Colo. 508, 181 P.2d 1020 (1947), and Wahl v. Sheehan, 54 F. Supp.
56 (D.C. Mo. 1944), both of which involved an unknown sum of money placed by the donor
in an envelope which belonged to the donee but which the donor retained in his possession.
Cases in which the donor rents a safety deposit box in the name of his intended donee, places
property therein, and requires the donee to authorize him to have access to the box are
somewhat related. See Livingston v. Powell, 257 Ala. 38, 57 So.2d 521 (1952); Reese v. Phila-
delphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co., 218 Pa. 150, 67 Atl. 124 (1907); In re Kaufmann, 281
Pa. 519, 127 Atl. 133 (1924).
1966]
Catholic University Law Review
said that a bailee at will receives possession of property when it is given into
his physical control even though the bailor can at any time terminate the
bailment and vest in himself the right to immediate possession. 29 The bailor's
right is a bare legal one, dependent wholly upon juridical procedures for
its execution; it is not a physical power. It is independent in the sense that
it springs from the agreement of the parties; it does not necessarily inhere
in all such transactions nor does it spring from some defect in the conduct
of the parties in entering into the transaction.
Since the retention of such a legal right does not preclude the passage of
possession, it is submitted that it should not necessarily preclude the effec-
tiveness of a delivery by manual tradition when physical control is surren-
dered. This would explain the validity of the deliveries found in the revo-
cable trust and the causa mortis gift cases. The trustee receives possession
of the res when it is placed in his physical control even though the settlor
retains a legal right through the exercise of which he can recover the prop-
erty for his own use. The same is true of the causa mortis donee. In each
case the reserved right is independent in the sense that it does not neces-
sarily inhere in all such transactions but rather springs from the intention
of the parties formed before the transaction was entered into.3 0 In each case,
the reserved right is a legal one; it is not a physical power.
Special notice must be taken of gifts completed through the use of inter-
mediaries. When the intermediary is found to be the agent of the donor,
the courts generally hold that there is no delivery until the agent actually
presents the res to the donee.3 ' In such cases, the res generally passes out of
the physical control of the donor as soon as the agent leaves his presence.
The only control he retains is the legal right to revoke the authority of the
agent. Yet the courts are almost unanimous in holding that delivery is not
complete as long as the agent retains the res. These cases can be harmonized
with our theory of manual tradition simply by pointing out that technically
the agent receives merely custody, and not legal possession, of property en-
trusted to him by his principal.3 2 Moreover, it seems arguable that in such
cases the donor's power is not really an independent one. It springs out of
" See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 74 (2d ed. 1955).
00 Even though the right of revocation inheres in all causa mortis gifts, it is based upon the
presumed intention of the donor. See Part II, at note 7.
n See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 40 (2d ed. 1955).
u It seems clear that an act sufficient to pass legal possession to the donee is required
for a valid delivery by manual tradition. I WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 28 (1947). Generally, however, the sufficiency of any particular act is judged by
the transfer of factual, and not legal, possession. This test is used, however, simply for prac-
tical reasons. Legal possession generally depends upon ownership and, in gift cases, this in
turn depends upon the validity of the transaction. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45 (2d
ed. 1955).
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the relationship that the law creates between principals and agents. It in-
heres in the nature of the agent's "possession" and does not spring from
sonic special agreement attached to the relationship. And finally it should
be noted that, in the eyes of the law, the agent is merely an extension of
the personality of the principal, his alter ego. Thus even though in fact the
res passes out of the physical control of the principal, nevertheless in the
eyes of the law it does not.
Courts have recently shown a marked reluctance to permit these tech-
nical rules to defeat the obvious intentions of serious minded donors. The
simple expedient used by courts is to find that the intermediary is not the
agent of the donor.3 A variety of factors have been considered in these
cases as material in determining the status of the intermediary.8 4 However,
where the donor expressly or impliedly reserves the right to reclaim the
property from the intermediary, the courts have generally considered this
of' critical significance and as over-riding all other factors, and have gen-
erally hchl the intermediary to be an agent of the donor. 5 It is submitted
that this is an unfortunate result that has frustrated many serious attempts
at revocable gifts. Be that as it may, we are now only trying to limit the gen-
erality of the broad rule frequently announced in these cases. Though state-
ncints in these cases often seem to preclude any type of revocable gift, it is
clear that these courts have considered the reserved power as bearing upon
the status of the intermediary rather than as bearing directly upon the valid-
ity of the delivery. The argument of these courts is: the reserved power con-
''Smith v. Fshchnan, 235 Ala. 588, 180 So. 313 (1938); Farris v. Farris, 269 Ky. 466, 107
S.W.2d 299 (1937); Gernert v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 284 Ky. 575, 145 S.W.2d 522
(1940); Larkin v. McCabe, 211 Minn. 11, 299 N.W. 649 (1941); Smith v. Smith, 313 S.W.2d
753 (Mo. App. 1958): BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 40 (2d ed. 1955).
3, See Note, 57 MicH. L. REv. 295 (1958), where the following factors are suggested as be-
ing material: 1) the clarity of present donative intent; 2) knowledge by the donee of the
transaction; 5) reasons for use of intermediary; 4) subsequent conduct of intermediary;
5) status of intermediary in other transactions involving the parties; and 6) ultimate dis-
position of res if the gift is held ineffective.
5 Baugh v. Howze, 211 Ark. 222, 199 S.W.2d 940 (1947); Daus v. Drusilla Home, 118 Ind.
App. 639, 79 N.E.2d 420 (1948); Hill v. Hill, 144 Me. 224, 67 A.2d 533 (1949); Geisel v. Burg,
283 Mich. 73, 227 N.W. 904 (1937); Wilson v. Davis, 110 Mont. 356, 103 P.2d 149 (1940);
Zeman v. Mikolasek, 75 N.D. 41, 25 N.W.2d 272 (1946); Lynch v. Lynch, 201 S.C. 130, 21
S.E.2d 569 (1942); Roseman v. Sauber, 232 Wisc. 581, 288 N.W. 173 (1939). But see Scoville
v. Vail Investment Co.. 55 Ariz. 486, 103 P.2d 662 (1940); Leedham v. Leedham, 218 Iowa
767, 254 N.W. 61 (1934); Daggett v. Simonds, 173 Mass. 340, 53 N.E. 907 (1899); Worth v.
Case, 42 N.Y. 362 (1870); In re Rynier, 475 Pa. 471, 32 A.2d 736 (1943); Giddings v. Giddings,
51 Vt. 227, 31 Am. Rep. 682 (1878).
When the intermediary is instructed to hold the property and deliver it to the donee only
in the event of the donor's death, the cases are widely divided. Some view this as merely a
means of postponing the done's beneficial enjoyment of the property and sustain the trans-
action; others feel that the expressed contingency means that the donee is to receive the
property only if the donor does not reclaim it before his death and hold the transaction in-
effective. See Meciern. The Requirement of Delives
,
in Gifts, 21 ILL. L. REV 568, 596 (1927).
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stitutes the intermediary an agent of the donor; but when delivery is at-
tempted through such an agent, it is not complete until he surrenders the
res to the donee; therefore there has been no delivery. Clearly this reason-
ing does not justify the conclusion that the reservation of a power of revo-
cation is fatal to all attempts at delivery. It is applicable only to the inter-
mediary cases.
Failure of courts to recognize that loss of physical power is the critical
factor in delivery by manual tradition has also occasionally led courts to
hold gifts void because following the transfer of physical power the donor
had a legal power-though not a right-to defeat the title of the donee. Thus
in Hippie v. Skolmutch,36 the donor purchased an automobile as a present
for his grandson. The donor could not drive and there was some evidence
that the grandson agreed to drive him wherever he might want to go. Since
the grandson was a minor, the car was registered in the donor's name. Phys-
ical control of the car was surrendered to the grandson who actually drove
it for several months before the donor died. A statute provided that, "No
person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof.., shall acquire any
right, title, claim, or interest in or to said motor vehicle until he shall have
had issued to him a certificate of title .. " The trial court held that there
was no gift simply because the statute prevented title from passing. The ap-
pellate court affirmed, but was unwilling to lay its decision solely upon the
statutory provision. The appellate court held the gift void because of a de-
fective delivery, saying:
Under the facts herein the decedent at any time could have changed his mind if
Paul had not driven him where he wanted to go, or for any other reason, and
could have sold or mortgaged the automobile at any time. Had decedent executed
an assignment to an innocent third party, Paul would have been without re-
course.... In this case the decedent did not irrevocably give up control and do-
minion over the chattel.
This reasoning of the court is ambiguous. The court said that the delivery
was defective because the donor could transfer title to the car to a third
party, leaving Paul without recourse; that this was in derogation of the
dominion and control that must be surrendered. But what did the court
mean by this? Recourse against whom? The third party? Or the donor?
If the court meant the former, then it is clearly wrong. The fact that a
donor might be in a position to defeat the title of the donee to the subject
of the gift by a transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value is wholly imma-
terial in determining the validity of the gift.a7 If the court meant that the
8 88 Ohio App. 529, 100 N.E.2d 645 (1950).
17 See Beals v. Lord, 86 R.I. 241, 134 A.2d 127 (1957). See also the many cases in which the
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delivery was defective because Paul would have had no recourse against
the donor, then it is begging the question. Whether or not Paul would have
recourse in such case would depend upon the validity of the gift. This was
not an attempted revocable gift where it was stipulated that Paul would have
no recourse if the donor revoked the gift. Giving full credence to all the
evidence in the case, the only circumstance in which the parties agreed that
Paul would have no recourse was if he refused to drive the donor wherever
he wanted to go. But the court does not premise its argument upon his
circumstance. It says that Paul would have no recourse if the donor revoked
"for any... reason." The only possible basis for this conclusion is that the
court considered the gift invalid for some other reason. Clearly this con-
clusion cannot be used in demonstrating the invalidity of the gift for it as-
sumes what must be proven.
This is an error that crops up in many decisions where the donor has ex-
pressed no intent that the gift should in any way be revocable. While argu-
ing to a defective delivery because the donor was priviledged to undo the
transaction, the court premises its conclusion that he was so priviledged on
the fact that the gift was invalid for some reason other than this supposed
defect in the delivery. Though the statement of the requisites of a valid de-
livery which is often found in these cases seems to preclude the validity of
any type of revocable gift, it is clear that such statements are too broad and
not good authority for that proposition.8
So far, discussion has been limited to cases where a delivery by manual
tradition was attempted. There are many cases in which such delivery is
property following the gift was returned to the custody of the donor; BROWN, PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 39 (2d ed. 1955).
Where the rights of the donor's creditors are concerned, the retention of such power has
been held material. See Allen-West Commission Co. v. Grumbles, 129 Fed. 287 (8th Cir.
1904); Little v. Willets, 55 Barb. 125 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869). In the former case, the court rec-
ognized that in so far as the rights of the parties between themselves were concerned the
gift was valid.
M See, e.g., Williams v. Chamberlain, 165 Ill. 210, 46 N.E. 250 (1896); Peters' Adm'r. v.
Peters, 224 Ky. 493, 6 S.W.2d 499 (1928); Cartall v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 Mo. 372,
153 S.W.2d 370 (1941); In re Humphrey, 191 App.Div. 291, 181 N.Y.S. 169 (1920); Davis v.
National Bank of Tulsa, - Okla. -, 353 P.2d 482 (1960). In the Williams case, the court
argued that since there had been no transmutation of possession the gift was revocable and
therefore void; clearly the argument should have been that since the gift had not been
perfected by a valid delivery, it was ineffective and therefore "revocable."
Much of this confusion seems to spring from the oft-repeated statement that gifts are
revocable until perfected by a valid delivery. Technically, this statement is inaccurate; for
clearly there is no gift whatsoever, in the legal sense of the term, until the transaction has
been perfected by a valid delivery. (Historically, this might not have always been so. See
Jenk. 108, 145 Eng.Rep. 76). The statement is designed merely to convey the idea that until
the transaction has been perfected by a valid delivery, the intending donor is not legally
bound by-and thus, in a sense, can revoke-whatever donative intent he might have formed
and whatever acts in execution thereof he might have taken. The statement thus uses the
word, gifts, in a nontechnical sense to describe any act or conduct that a layman might
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not required. Though delivery is still generally defined in terms of the sur-
render of dominion and control in these cases, they seldom in so far as they
involve gifts of chattels produce statements embarrassing to the theory of de-
livery being propounded herein; for it is generally clear that when speaking
of the loss of dominion and control, the court is referring to physical con-
trol over the chattel and that depending upon the circumstances it is often
satisfied with less than the surrender of all such control.
There are, however, many statements in cases involving gifts of choses
in action that seem to relate the requirement of delivery to the surrender of
legal rights and powers. Ambiguity in this area is understandable for choses
are merely legal rights, and it is easy to think in terms of the loss of the right
or power to maintain suit on the chose when looking for a surrender of con-
trol. But the loss of the right to maintain suit cannot be the test of a valid
delivery for it is an effect of the gift, not a prerequisite to it.39
Perhaps the clearest illustration of error that has resulted from the un-
warranted stress in cases involving gifts of choses on the surrender of legal
rights can be found in the bank account cases. The early cases generally
held that when a donor attempted to make a gift of an interest in his ac-
count by changing its designation on the bank's books into the joint names
of himself and the donee, no gift was effected as long as the donor retained
his right of withdrawal.4 0 These cases usually reasoned to a defective delivery
because the donor had retained control through his right to withdraw the
deposit. The trend of recent decisions, however, has been away from this re-
sult and to recognize that the mere reservation of a right to withdraw does
not preclude the effectiveness of the gift.41
How can the dominion and control test be applied to this type of case?
There is no surrender of physical power over any tangible thing. Nor is
there a loss of all jural rights through the exercise of which control may be
exerted over the chose. It is submitted that part of the answer lies in the
fact that the donor loses control over the act of delivery itself. It is of such
conceivably consider to be a gift. When it is remembered that the statement uses the word
in this sense, it is innocuous enough; for then it is clear that it does not tell us anything
about true gifts. It is only when we forget that the word is not used in its technical sense
that we are tempted to turn the statement around and generalize a bit and come up with
the erroneous rule that if a gift is in any way revocable then there has been no valid delivery.
The difficulty in applying the loss of dominion and control test to gifts of choses is well
pointed out in 4 CORBIN, CONTRAcTs § 911 (1951).
10 See, e.g., Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 136 S.E. 444 (1927); Taylor v. Grimes, 223 Iowa
821, 273 N.W. 898 (1937); Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 43 Atl. 45 (1899); Rose v.
Osborne, 133 Me. 487, 180 AtI. 315 (1935); Flanagan v. Nash, 185 Pa. 41, 39 At. 818 (1898);
Daly v. Pacific Savings & Loan Ass'n, 154 Wash. 249, 282 Pac. 60 (1929).
"See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 65 (2d ed. 1955); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 793, 914
(1951); Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. CHI. L. Rv. 376
(1959).
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a character that he cannot reasonably expect to be able to deny that it ever
took place.4 2 [The fact that the title of the account was changed must al-
ways stand. The donor cannot hide this fact or retrieve the evidence of it.]
But, it is felt, that the more important thing is that by performing the act
the donor signifies his intent to be legally bound by the transaction of which
it is a part and thus loses his complete, personal control over the effects of
the transaction. The act consummates his donative intent and makes the
whole transaction a jural act.43 He is now and forever committed to its legal
effects. He cannot change them in any manner. Concededly he can still alter
the practical effects of the transaction. But these can be changed, not by
denying that a gift had been made, but only by going forward with the trans-
action, by conceding the effectiveness of the gift and performing the jural
act that the terms of the transaction provide as the means of changing the
practical effects. As the court in one of these cases said, the gift "might sub-
sequently prove valueless.... But for what it was worth it was a completed
gift." 44
It is impossible to rationalize all of the intricacies of the requirement of
delivery in gifts of personal property. In his scholarly study, however, Pro-
fessor Mechem discovered three desiderata that are generally served by the
requirement as it is applied in most of the cases:
[It] a) makes vivid and dear to the donor the act he is doing, b) makes unequivo-
cal to contemporary witnesses, if any, the nature of the act done, and c) gives to
the donee, subsequently to the alleged gift, something which may serve as at least
presumptive evidence of the truth of his claim.
45
Implicit in these desiderata, if not actually expressed in the second, is a recog-
Laymen realize the importance of proof to a law suit. They know that the chances of
their being successfully sued depend in part upon the strength of the proof that is avail-
able to their adversary. Thus it does not seem unreasonable to relate the firmness of their
intention to be legally bound by a particular transaction to the strength of the proof of that
transaction that they make available to the other party.
Though the registration of stock in the name of another is generally held to be a suffi-
cient delivery to sustain a gift of the stock to the other even though the donor retains pos-
session of the newly-issued certificates, some courts have been reluctant to apply the rule
when the corporation was dominated by the donor and he was in control of its stock books.
See Scott v. Self, 208 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1953); In re Jackson, 300 Ill. App. 566, 21 N.E.2d 792
(1939); In re McCoy, 189 Wash. 103, 63 P.2d 522 (1957).
"A jural act:
does not come into existence as an act until the whole has been uttered. As almost all
important transactions are preceded by tentative and preparatory negotiations and
drafts, the problem is to ascertain whether and when the utterance was final .... The
necessity for a delivery of a document, and the nature of a delivery, are here the most
usual questions in. practice.
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2404 (3d ed. 1940).
"Burns v. Nolette, 83 N.H. 489, 144 Atl. 848 (1929).
" Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 354 (1926).
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nition that delivery has a packaging effect upon the transaction that enables
witnesses-but more importantly, a court-to say with reasonable certainty
that the donor is no longer merely thinking of making the gift but has actu-
ally done so and now intends his previously expressed donative intent to
have legal effect. In this respect, the requirement of delivery serves the same
purpose in the law of gifts as it does in many other areas. The law is careful
not to attach legal significance to proposed transactions until it is reasonably
certain that the parties themselves intended the transaction to produce legal
effects. Thus the mere signing of a deed or contract is not sufficient to make
it legally operative; the signer must also manifest his intent to be legally
bound by the instrument by "delivering" it. It is submitted that the require-
ment of delivery in gifts is designed in part at least to serve this same pur-
pose: to indicate the donor's intent that the gift is now complete and legally
operative.
In the joint bank account cases, the changing of the title of the account
on the bank's books serves this as well as Mechem's other desiderata. It is
the type of act that a reasonable man would perform only with deliberation
and an intent to implement and effectuate some desired purpose. Since a
power of revocation in the form of a right to withdraw is retained, it con-
cededly does not require the same amount of deliberation about the practi-
cal consequences as would otherwise be involved. But in the same manner,
a gift of a hundred dollars requires less deliberation than a gift of a thousand
dollars; yet the same type of act is recognized as a valid delivery for a gift
of either amount. Deliberation about the practical consequences is not too
important a consideration for it will automatically be present in direct pro-
portion to the value of the gift once an intent to make the transaction legally
enforceable is found. And such an intent is found in the act of changing the
title of the account. Laymen know that the ownership of a bank account is
generally identified by the record of the account on the bank's books. Thus
they know that the addition of another's name to their account is an act of
which the law takes cognizance. Therefore when they perform such an act,
it can be construed as an expression of an intent to give legal effect to, and
thus accept the legal consequences of, the transaction of which it is a part.
It is submitted that this end served by the requirement of delivery explains
the true significance of the phrase, loss of dominion and control, as used in
these cases. The act must be of such a character that it signifies the donor's
intention to surrender control over the legal effects of the transaction. It
must indicate his unqualified intent that the transaction now has legal sig-
nificance, that it is now legally binding on him and that its effects are to be
determined by legal rules and principles and not wholly by his personal ca-
price. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the donor must surrender
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control over the practical consequences of the transaction. The legal effects
and the practical consequences must be distinguished. When a revocable
trust is created, the legal effect of the transaction is the immediate convey-
ance of a defeasible interest in the property to the cestui. The settlor is ir-
revocably committed to this effect, and cannot change it in any manner. But
the practical effect of the transaction remains subject to the settlor's control;
for by exercising his reserved power, he can terminate the cestui's interest at
any time he sees fit. Though an exercise of the power seems to destroy the
legal effect of the original transaction, it does not. Any complete abstract of
the title to the property will have to show that the cestui for a time owned
a defeasible interest therein.
That this is the true meaning of the dominion and control test seems clear-
ly indicated by the many cases in which a valid delivery was found even
though the donor did not part with other types of dominion and control.
Thus in Hillebrant v. Brewer,46 a valid delivery was found in the donor's act
of placing the donee's brand on certain cattle even though he retained physi-
cal control of the animals thereafter. 47 In Rand v. Rand,48 a valid delivery
was found in the donor's act of filing an affidavit on the public records show-
ing his wife as the owner of a business even though he continued to manage
and control the business till his death.49 In Smith v. Acorn,5o a valid delivery
was found in the donor's act of delivering a written assignment of an auto-
mobile to the donee even though he retained physical control of the car and
an element of doninion in the right to use it until his death. 51 In Garrett v.
Keister,52 a valid delivery was found in the donor's act of taking from his
debtor and recording an installment note made payable to the donee even
though the donor retained possession of the note and a larger element of
dominion in the right to collect and use all payments of principal and in-
4 6 Tex. 45, 55 Am. Dec. 757 (1851).
'4 See also cases involving gifts of stock accomplished by registering it in the name of the
donee while the donor retains possession of the newly-issued certificates. Wilmington Trust
Co. v. General Motors Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 572,51 A.2d 584 (1947); Becker v. Glenn, 29 F. Supp.
558 (D.C. Ky. 1959); Crouse v. Judson, 41 Misc. 338, 84 N.Y.S. 755 (1903); Manning v. United
States National Bank of Portland, 174 Ore. 118, 148 P.2d 255 (1944).
," 132 F. Supp. 929 (D.C. Ky. 1955). This case well illustrates the confusion that has been
generated by the control formula. Though the court parroted the phrase about parting
"with all present and future control of the property," it sustained the gift even though it
found that until his death the donor "continued to use the property and to draw on the
bank account [an asset of the business] and in a general way to conduct his affairs as he had
prior to" the gift.
9See also Gordon v. Barr, 13 Cal.2d 596, 91 P.2d 101 (1939); Wilmington Trust Co., v.
General Motors Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 572, 51 A.2d 584 (1947); Hardymon v. Glenn, 56 F. Supp.
269 (D.C. Ky. 1944); Bryant's Adm'r. v. Bryant, 269 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1954).
32 A.2d 252 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943).
"See also M'Kane's Ex'rs. v. Bonner, 1 Bailey 113 (S.C. 1828).
-56 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
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terest that might come due before her death.53 Finally in many causa mortis
gift and revocable trust cases, valid deliveries were found under a variety of
circumstances even though the donors and settlors retained the largest ele-
ments of dominion and control in their right to appropriate all of the prop-
erties to their own uses. Though all these donors retained substantial
amounts of dominion and control, nevertheless each transaction was exe-
cuted by the performance of an act that signified an intention that the trans-
action of which it was a part was to have legal significance, that its effects
were to be determined by legal rules and not wholly by the personal caprice
of the donor.
In summary then, it is submitted that the vast majority of the statements
that seem to indicate that the reservation by a donor of any type of a power
or right to revoke the gift precludes the validity of the delivery are clear
dicta. In most of these cases, it is clear that all that the court meant was that
the donor must surrender physical control over the res. The meaning of the
phrase in other cases is obscure but most of these cases can be harmonized
by relating it to a requirement that the donor manifest an intent to lose per-
sonal control over the legal effects of the transaction. The act of delivery
must be of such a nature that it signifies the donor's intention that the trans-
action is to have legal significance, is to be governed by legal rules and prin-
ciples. The requirement of surrendering physical control in the manual
tradition cases is merely a particularization of this more general principle;
when the property is capable of passing out of the donor's physical control,
this is the natural act that indicates his intention to be legally bound.54 When
the act is of such a nature that it does signify an intention to be le-
gally bound, an intention that the effects of the transaction are no longer
wholly subject to the personal caprice of the donor but rather are to be de-
termined by legal rules and principles, then it is submitted that the act con-
stitutes a valid delivery even though the terms of the transaction reserve a
legal right or power through the exercises of which the donor may undo its
practical consequences.
PART IV: CONCERNING QUALIFIED DONATIVE INTENT
Statements in many cases seem to indicate that every attempt by a donor to
reserve any kind of right or power to revoke his gift will necessarily detract
1 See also Connelly v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 138 Cal. App. 2d 303,
291 P.2d 501 (1956); Thatcher v. Merriam, 121 Utah 191, 240 P.2d 266 (1952).
"Though the law seems set in its opposition, the intermediary cases could be evaluated by
this norm. When the intermediary is a personal servant, closely dependent upon the em-
ployer and thus sensitive to his every wish, the transfer of physical control to the servant
clearly does not have the flavor of finality that the law requires. But when the intermediary
is more independent, e.g., a lawyer or banker brought in only to effectuate the transaction,
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from the proper intent required for a valid gift inter vivos. It is clear that in
order to make a valid gift the donor must have a present donative intent,
that is, he must intend to pass to the donee here and now, at the time the
expression of gift is made, title to the property, or at least such interest there-
in as he intends to be the subject of the gift.' His intent cannot be that the
title or interest will pass tomorrow, or next year, or at any other future time.
If such is his intent, then he has merely promised to make the gift at such
future time and the promise is unenforceable unless supported by considera-
tion.2 Moreover, if the donor intends that the title will pass only at his death,
an added difficulty is encountered, for then the transaction is testamentary
and void for that reason, unless executed with the formalities of a will.8
Since most attempts at revocable gifts have come under judicial scrutiny
at the donor's death, it is the latter objection-the absence of testamentary
formalities-that has generally been pressed upon the courts. It is generally
argued that since the donor retained the power or right of revoking the gift
at any time before his death, he could not have had a present donative in-
tent, he could not have intended that the donee receive any interest in the
property until his death. It is submitted that this argument is fallacious. 4
Conveyors of land 5 and settlors of trusts6 must have a similar in praesenti
intent. Yet deeds and trust instruments are frequently held effective to pres-
ently pass an interest to the grantee or cestui despite the fact that they might
reserve a power of revocation.7 Such reserved powers are generally held not
to negative the requisite intent but merely to qualify and limit the estate
conveyed by the instrument. Is it not possible that a donor's power of revoca-
tion might also merely limit the estate of the donee?
the average layman should perceive the possibility of legal consequences being attached to
a transfer of possession to him, and thus in such cases it seems that such an act could be
viewed as a valid delivery even though a power of revocation had been reserved. See Daggett
v. Simonds, 173 Mass. 340, 53 N.E. 907 (1899).
See BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 48 (2d ed. 1955), wherein a gift is defined as "a present
passing of title."
2 Kraus v. Kraus, 235 Ind. 325, 132 N.E.2d 608 (1956); Pomerantz v. Pomerantz, 179 Md.
436, 19 A.2d 713 (1941); Berman v. Leckner, 193 Md. 177, 66 A.2d 392 (1949); Smith v. Smith,
353 Mo. 1073, 192 S.W.2d 691 (1946); 1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF REAL PROP-
ERTY § 32 (1947).
S 1 PAGE, WILLS § 6.16 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960).
'The argument seems to spring primarily from the general confusion that identifies re-
vocability as the essential characteristic of a will. But it is its ambulatory nature that makes
a will testamentary; revocability is but an effect of this essential characteristic. See 1 PAGE,
WILLS § 5.17 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960); 4 TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 1071
(1939).
5 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.64 (1952); 4 TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY §
1070 (3d ed. 1939).
1 SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 26 (2d ed. 1956).
1 SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRusns § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956); Garvey, Revocable Gifts of Legal In-
terests in Land, 54 Ky. L. J. 19 (1965).
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Through centuries of adjudications, the courts have developed a techni-
cal and sometimes bewildering scheme of estates in our land law. Pollock
and Maitland observed that the "most salient trait" of this branch of the
law is the fact that proprietary rights in land may be projected upon the
plane of time and divided into a variety of chronologically successive seg-
ments, each having a duration of its own.8 Today we are accustomed to deal-
ing with such divisions of the ownership of land and to calling most9 of the
segments, future interests. The term is somewhat misleading for it seems to
imply that the interest has only future, and no present, existence. But this
is not the case. The word, future, refers not to the time when the interest
comes into being but merely to the time when the interest will or may be-
come possessory.0 From the moment of its creation, the future interest is a
part of the total ownership. It is a part of the bundle of rights to which we
refer when we speak of the complete and absolute title. It has just as much
present existence as any other part of that bundle, including the rights of
the owner of the possessory interest.1
It is this recognition of the future interest in land as a presently existing
though remote segment of ownership that enables us to classify, as valid in-
ter vivos conveyances, many deeds of land that appear to have testamentary
characteristics. The deed of a future interest produces its full and complete
operative effect upon delivery.' 2 It immediately conveys a segment of owner-
ship to the grantee. It has no other, no later, effect. If the grantee subse-
quently becomes entitled to possession of the land, it is not because the deed
creates any new right in him at that time. It is simply because all the other
segments of ownership--or, at least, all those prior to the grantee's-have
expired or been defeated and the event has occurred which entitles the
grantee, by virtue of his previously existing partial ownership, to possession.
Through centuries of "following the law," the chancellors devised a sim-
ilar system of equitable ownership for cestuis que trust. The recognition of
the equitable future interest of a remote trust beneficiary as a presently ex-
isting segment of the total equitable ownership of the trust res enables us
to explain why the revocable trust, the most popular modern will substitute,
is technically not a testamentary device. When A declares himself trustee
of certain property for his own benefit for life remainder for B, the trust is
not testamentary even though A also reserves a power to revoke the trust
at any time he sees fit. As Professor Scott explains, "the beneficiary at once
12 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 10 (2d ed. 1898).
9 For exclusions, see 2 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 153 (1936).10 SIMEs & SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1 (2d ed. 1956).
1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 5 (1936).
22 Ballantine, When Are Deeds Testamentary, 18 MICH. L. REv. 470 (1920); 2 TIFFANY, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 359 (2d ed. 1939).
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acquires a future interest, although it is an interest subject to be divested
by the exercise of the power."' 13 When A dies without exercising the power,
B's partial ownership becomes total ownership, not because B receives a new
title at that time but merely because A's partial title and power are then ex-
tinguished. Thus the declaration of trust operated fully, completely and only
during A's life. It was in no way testamentary.
It is true, of course, that our law of personal property does not completely
parallel our law of real property. The sources of the two were different and
many factors that moulded the one had little influence in the development
of the other. Chattels, especially those that were typical in medieval society,14
generally lack the elements of permanence and indestructibility that are
characteristic of land. In view of this, it is not too surprising that our an-
cestors failed to countenance attempts to create future interests in them.' 5
The bulk of our personal property today, however, is no longer of this type.
Not only do we have more durable chattels but we also have intangible per-
sonalty, the permanence of which somewhat resembles that of land.16 As
these more permanent forms of personalty became common, the courts bor-
rowed from the law of real property and began recognizing the possibility
of creating future interests therein.'7 In the United States today, it is gen-
erally said that the same types of future interests may be created in noncon-
sumable personalty as may be created in land.'8
Before this development had taken place, many courts framed a rule to
the effect that gifts inter vivos must be absolute and unconditional, that the
donor must part with all interest in the donated property and could retain
" 1 SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956); see also 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUST-
.as § 103 (1951).14
"Mhe typical chattel in medieval society was the beast." BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 7 (2d ed. 1955).
25 "In the early days of English history, holdings of choses in action and durable personal
property were comparatively insignificant.... So it was then considered that the ownership
of personal property was absolute and incapable of division into successive interests ......
Woodard v. Clark, 236 N.C. 190, 72 S.E.2d 433 (1952).
The early cases were also influenced by the thought that attempts to create future inter-
ests in chattels were analogous to attempts to create future interests in chattels real. There
was a legal presumption that a life esate was larger than any term for years and thus it was
frequently held that the grantee of a life estate in a term for years received the whole
leasehold estate. See GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 76 (4th ed. 1942); SiMES &
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 384 (2d ed. 1956).
Business corporations are now frequently perpetual. See 8 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
rHE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4082 (Perm.ed. 1931).
17 The historical development of the idea of future interests in personalty and the Ameri-
can theory which views them in the same way as future interests in realty, i.e., as presently-
existing segments of total ownership, is well presented in GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PER-
PETurriEs 723-51 (4th ed. 1942). See also SMEs & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§§ 351-371 (2d ed. 1956).
182 REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY 814 (1936); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 87 (4th
ed. 1942). Cf. SIMEs & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 360-63 (2d ed. 1956).
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no part of the title in himself. This was merely an application of the ancient
rule that a "gift or devise of a chattel for an hour is forever."'19 It was a par-
ticularization of the general rule that recognized no form of property in
personalty other than absolute and indefeasible ownership and which thus
prohibited the division of the title to personal property into successive seg-
ments. The rule caused many early courts to strike down attempted gifts of
personalty in which the donor had reserved to himself a life estate.20 Thus
in Foscue v. Foscue,21 the court held a deed of gift ineffective because the
donor had reserved a life estate. The court's opinion is short and merely ex-
presses "regret, that a disposition of property so just and simple in itself,
cannot be sustained." The theory of the decision can be found in counsel's
argument: "So where a grant is made to one to take effect after the whole
estate of which the thing is capable is expended, nothing can pass to the
grantee, but the whole remains as before in the grantor." Now that the basis
of the rule has disappeared, such gifts are genrally sustained today22 pro-
vided they are accomplished by deed or a valid delivery.23
The rule, that gifts must be absolute and unconditional, also caused early
cases to hold all gifts upon condition void, but today it is generally recog-
nized that not all conditions render such transactions ineffective. Thus, it is
commonly held that gifts made in contemplation of marriage are valid even
though conditional.24 Gifts upon condition that the donee use the property
19tBROOKE, ABR. DEVISE 13 (1576).
20 Gilbert v. Murdock, 2 Hayw. 182 (N.C. 1802); Graham v. Graham, 2 Hawks 322 (N.C.
1823); Vernon v. Inabnit, 2 Brev. 411 (S.C. 1810); Ingram v. Porter, 4 M'Cord, L. 198 (S.C.
1827).
2 3 Hawks 538 (N.C. 1825).
0 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 253 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1958); Gordon v. Barr, 13 Cal. 2d 596,
91 P.2d 101 (1939); In re McVicker's Estate, 39 I1. App. 2d 389, 188 N.E.2d 731 (1963);
Hurley v. Schuler, 296 Ky. 118, 176 S.W.2d 275 (1943); Howard v. Hobbs, 125 Md. 636, 94
At. 318 (1915); Green v. Redmond, 132 Md. 166, 103 Atl. 431 (1918); Innes v. Potter, 130
Minn. 320, 153 N.W. 604, 3 A.L.R. 896 (1915); Shaffer v. Kuthy, 145 Ohio St. 516, 62 N.E2d
199 (1945); Beals v. Lord, 86 R.I. 111, 132 A.2d 127 (1957); Alexander v. Burnett, 5 Rich. L.
189 (S.C. 1851). Cf. In re Waggoner's Estate, 5 Ill. App. 2d 130, 125 N.E.2d 154 (1955).
There is some confusion in the New York cases. In Doty v. Wilson, 5 Lans. 7 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.
1871), the court said that a gift of money could not be valid since the donor had reserved
the right to collect interest on the sum until he died. See also In re McKay's Will, 120
N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sur. 1953), af'd, 282 App. Div. 744, 122 N.Y.S.2d 926, motion for leave to ap-
peal denied 282 App. Div. 841, 124 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1953). But in In re Sussman's Estate, 125
N.Y.S.2d 584 (1953), afl'd, 283 App. Div. 1051, 131 N.Y.S.2d 880, 284 App. Div. 844, 134
N.Y.S.2d 584 (1954), the court said that gifts of remainder interests following reserved life
estates in donors are "clearly" valid but that the only way such a gift can be accomplished
by parol is by "an absolute delivery" of the property "to the donee, vesting the entire legal
title and possession in him, on his undertaking to account to the donor for the interest
which he may collect thereon." Similar language, suggesting that the donor does not re-
serve a part of title but merely creates a contract or trust duty in the donee, can be found
in other New York cases.
" Conerning the problem of delivery in gifts of future interests, see infra note 59.
2 See Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 579 (1952).
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for a specific purpose25 or that he provide for the support and burial of the
donor26 have frequently been sustained. Though many cases can be found
parroting the rule that gifts must be absolute and unconditional, it is gen-
erally by way of clear dicta. Brown observes that these dicta are "too broad
to fit all the cases, and if distinctions be not carefully drawn are likely to lead
to error."27 Walsh states that they "are simply wrong." 28
Cases involving conditional gifts are of special interest for they demon-
strate that the donor may qualify the ultimate economic outcome of
his benefaction upon the occurrence of some future event without impair-
ing the requisite in praesenti intent. In attempting to harmonize the con-
flicting cases, Professor Brown distinguishes between gifts on conditions
precedent and those on conditions subsequent. 29 Though he spends much
time developing his position that the latter are valid, he dismisses the former
as invalid without much discussion. Though he never directly so states, he
apparently assumes that since no interest can immediately "vest" in the
donee when the condition is precedent, then no interest whatsoever can im-
mediately pass to him.30 Professor Walsh also maintains that conditional
gifts are valid but he is unwilling to accept Brown's distinction.31 He points
out that the only difference the nature of the condition makes is in the tech-
nical classification of the donee's interest as being either vested subject to
defeasance or contingent. Whether it is one or the other, he says, is imma-
terial in determining whether or not the transaction is testamentary. For
the only requirement is that the donee presently receive some interest and
it is universally recognized today that even a contingent interest is a pres-
ently-existing part of ownership.
Certainly Professor Walsh is right in this matter. The esoteric distinction
'See Edson v. Lucas, 40 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1930); Hurley v. Schuler, 296 Ky. 118, 176
S.W.2d 275 (1943); Simmer v. Flatt, 74 Okla. 140, 177 Pac. 545 (1919); University of Vermont
v. Wilbur's Estate, 105 Vt. 147, 163 At. 572 (1933).
See McNamare v. McDonald, 69 Conn. 484, 38 Atd. 54 (1897); Northern Trust Co., v.
Swartz, 309 Ill. 586, 143 N.E. 433 (1923); Curlee v. Hall, 296 Ky. 657, 178 S.W.2d 193 (1944);
Berry v. Cramer, 339 Mass. 777, 162 N.E.2d 167 (1959); Lewis v. Lewis, 354 Mo. 425, 189
S.W.2d 557 (1945); Gardella v. Santini, 65 Nev. 215, 193 P.2d 702 (1948); Reynolds v. Maust,
142 Pa.Super. 109, 15 A.2d 853 (1940).
'BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 49 (2d ed. 1955).
1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 32 (1947).
2 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 49 (2d ed. 1955).
0 Mechem apparently made the same assumption; see Mechem, The Requirement of De-
livery in Gifts, 21 ILL. L. REV. 568, 596 (1927). Simes points out that, at an early period of
time, the contingent remainder in land was looked upon, not as an estate or an interest in
property, but only as a possibility; it was not thought of as having present existence. He
then warns that the "influence of this concept continues to be felt in modern times, but its
significance is rapidly waning as the courts continue to recognize a contingent remainder as
giving rise to present legal relations between the holder thereof and other persons." SIMEs
& SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTs § 137 (2d ed. 1956).
8 1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 32 (1947).
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drawn in the field of real property between vested and contingent interests
is important today primarily only in cases involving the application of the
rule against perpetuities. 82 The distinction was of wider significance in the
past and concededly at one time it could have been material in determining
whether or not a transfer was testamentary. 8 But this is not so today. No
modem court would hold a deed of land testamentary merely because it
transferred only a contingent or non-vested interest to the grantee.84 Now
that the law has progressed to the point of permitting the creation of future
interests in personalty, it would be absurd to resurrect this outmoded relic
of the past and apply it to such interests.8 5
Though Walsh refutes the validity of Brown's distinction between condi-
tions that are precedent and those that are subsequent to the vesting of the
donee's title, his discussion of revocable gifts leaves much to be desired. In-
deed, his position on the essential validity of such transactions is not entire-
ly clear. While discussing the possibility of making gifts of future interests,
he unqualifiedly states that if such a gift is "subject to revocation by the do-
nor, it is a testamentary gift and therefore void." 36 Thus he apparently con-
demned all attempts at revocable gifts of future interests. Whether or not he
felt the same way about revocable gifts of possessory estates is not certain.
It must be conceded, however, that there is little reason to suspect that he
intended to distinguish in this respect between the two.3 7
Though Walsh did not recognize the possibility of a valid revocable gift,
ISee SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1233 (2d ed. 1956). To a lesser de-
gree, the distinction is also sometimes material in questions of destructibility, alienability,
taxation, etc. See id. at § 134.
The contingent remainder was once thought of as only a possibility of becoming an
estate; it was not considered as having present existence. See SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 137 (2d ed. 1956).
" See 4 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1070 (3d ed. 1939); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 12.65 (1952).
"It is difficult to find any American case involving a gift of a contingent interest. In
Abbot's Adm'r. v. Williams, 2 Brev. 38 (S.C. 1806), the court sustained a transaction as a
valid gift even though it said that it was subject to a condition precedent; the court ob-
served that absolute title vested at the donor's death when the condition had been performed.
In Love v. Francis, 63 Mich. 181, 29 N.W. 843 (1886), the court sustained a gift of a remain-
der-type interest to the "heirs" of the donor. The court, however, considered this a vested
remainder. See also Ford v. Ford, 270 Mich. 487, 259 N.W. 138 (1935), sustaining a gift of a
postponed interest that was subject to a condition of survivorship. English courts apparently
are not bothered by the technical classification of the donee's interest. Thus in 18 HALS-
BURY'S LAWS OF ENCLAND Gifts § 742 (3d ed. 1957), it is said: "Gifts may be made subject
to conditions either precedent or subsequent."
81 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 32 (1947).
Walsh does not explore the idea of a revocable gift. He simply dismisses such transactions
with the statement quoted in the test without discussing the cases that prompted him to
make it. It seems likely that he was solely interested in establishing the validity of gifts of
future interests in general, and of conditional gifts in particular, and that he was not really
concerned with revocable gifts as such. The statement in this context, however, seems odd.
The American Law Institute has indicated that an event that involves no element other
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Professor Brown did. After extensively discussing Blanchard v. Sheldon,38
he indicates his approval of the outcome of the case and seems to defend the
general idea of a revocable gift. He argues:
If the donor be permitted to make a gift of his entire interest in the chattel, it
is somewhat arbitrary to deny to him the possibility of creating, through gift,
limited and lesser interests. It may, of course, be said that if the donor reserves
the unlimited right to revoke in substance he has parted with no interest in the
subject matter at all, and since gifts to take effect only in the future are admit-
tedly unenforcible, gifts of this nature should be treated likewise. In the dilem-
ma presented the writer believes that the law should carry out the intentions of
the donor.... If the transaction on the formal side is distinguishable from the
mere promise to give, and no reason of public policy exists to thwart it, why
should not the will of the donor be sustained3 9
The source of many of the statements about the invalidity of revocable
gifts seems to be a line of cases represented by Walden's Adm'rs. v. Dixon40
and Irish v. Nutting.41 In the Walden case, a man was preparing to make a
journey. He gave a mare to a friend and told him that it was to be his if he
did not return. The traveler died without returning. In the Irish case, a
soldier, on his way to war, gave three promissory notes to a friend saying,
"Take them, and if I never return they are yours; if I do return I shall want
them." The soldier died about a year later without returning. In both of
these cases, the courts held that valid gifts had not been made and awarded
the property to the estates of the "donors." Though both of these cases are
frequently cited for the proposition that gifts inter vivos must be irrevocable,
it is submitted that their value as precedent today is very questionable. They
were both decided before the possibility of creating future interests in per-
sonal property was widely recognized and each opinion cites and relies upon
Blackstone's definition of a gift as the transfer of "the right and the posses-
sion of [property] whereby one man renounces, and another man immedi-
ately acquires, all title and interest therein." 42 A careful reading of these
opinions indicates that each transaction was held ineffective not so much
because it was revocable but rather because it was an attempted transfer of
than an exercise of the volition of the conveyor might possibly be a valid condition for the
defeasance of an estate. I RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 45, comment g, caveat (1936). If this is
so, then it seems clear that a donor could make a revocable gift in the form of a gift sub-
ject to a condition of the non-exercise of his volition, which would be technically indistin-
guishable from Walsh's other conditional gifts and clearly within his general thesis.
8843 Vt. 512 (1871), discussed in Part I supra.
BROWN, PERSONAl. PROPERTY § 49 (2d ed. 1955).
405 T.B.Mon. (21 Ky.) 170 (1827).
"147 Barb. 370 (N.Y. 1867).
122 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441.
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a qualified rather than an absolute interest. Such a rationalization is unac-
ceptable today.
It seems likely that Brown was influenced by these cases when he formu-
lated his distinction between conditions that are precedent and those that
are subsequent to the vesting of the donee's interest. He apparently approved
of the holdings and did not wish to criticize the cases. 48 Yet he also saw noth-
ing wrong with giving effect to the donor's intention in such cases as Blan-
chard v. Sheldon44 and Gould v. Van Horne.45 Looking at these two lines of
authority, he must have noted that in the one the donor generally phrased
the contingency in the form of a technical condition precedent (this is yours
if I die). In the other it was generally phrased in the technical language of
a condition subsequent (this is yours, but I reserve the right to take it back)
and thought that this was the critical distinction between them. But it is
submitted that if these two lines of cases are to be distinguished, 46 it should
be done on the basis of the time when title was intended to pass rather than
on the basis of the nature of that title. It seems possible to argue that the
donors in the Walden and the Irish cases did not really intend to pass any
title to their donees at the time of the transactions but were merely desig-
nating the persons they desired to receive title in the event of their deaths
during the activity. Each donor was about to undertake a somewhat perilous
activity. Each sought to provide for the safekeeping of the property during
the activity. Each had a definite intention to reclaim the property if and
when the activity was accomplished and in each case, the donee was to keep
the property only if his benefactor failed to survive the activity. None of
these circumstances were present in the Blanchard and the Gould cases.
Here the transfers of the property were not relatable to a desire to provide
for its safekeeping nor did these donors have any fixed intention to reclaim
it at some future time. Here the donors clearly seem to have intended to im-
, For other cases similar to the Walden and the Irish cases see: Guest v. Stone, 206 Ga.
239, 56 S.E.2d 247 (1949), where a soldier gave his bank book and a signed blank check to a
friend saying, "If I happen to crap out, it is all yours. If you need any money while I am
gone go to the bank and get it"; Smith v. Dorsey, 38 Ind. 451, 10 Am. Rep. 118 (1872), where
a soldier who had lent a gun to a friend said, "Well, if I never return, you may keep the
gun as a present from me"; Hafer v. McKelvey, 23 Pa. Super. 202 (1903), where a man before
going on a journey gave his landlady a promissory note saying that if he did not come
back, it was hers. Contra, Baker v. Williams, 34 Ind. 547 (1870), where a soldier deposited
money with a friend under a written agreement that the money would be returned if the
soldier came back, but that if he died, it would be paid to his sister; the transaction was
sustained. See also Virgin v. Gaither, 42 Ill. 39 (1866).
"43 Vt. 512 (1871), discussed supra in Part I.
" 45 Cal. App. 145, 187 Pac. 35 (1919), discussed supra in Part I.
"Possibly the Walden and the Irish cases should be criticized and not distinguished. Stress-
ing that the donors were able to reclaim the property only upon the occurrence of an event
beyond their control (survival of the activity), Walsh argues that they were wrongly de-
cided and that the transactions should have been given effect as valid conditional gifts. 1
WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 32 (1947).
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mediately pass title to their donees and, recognizing that this outstanding
title might embarrass them in the event of some unforeseen change of cir-
cumstance, they reserved the right to revoke it. Viewed in this light, it may
be said that the donors in the Walden and the Irish cases had made their
deaths conditions precedent to the gifts themselves, precedent to the passage
of any title to the donees. While the donors' deaths in the Blanchard and
the Gould cases were subsequent to the gifts, subsequent to the passage of
title to the donees, even though they were precedent to such title's becoming
absolute.
Though no gift case has been found in which the court expressly recog-
nized this distinction between conditions that are precedent and those that
are subsequent to the gift itself, the distinction is not completely novel. It is
similar to the distinction currently drawn in the field of trusts to distinguish
valid inter vivos trusts from invalid testamentary attempts. According to the
Restatement, a trust is testamentary "where the death of settlor is a condi-
tion precedent." 47 Clearly, this does not mean that a trust is testamentary
if the settlor's death was precedent merely to the vesting of the cestui's in-
terest. For there is no doubt that a trust may be inter vivos even though the
interest of all beneficiaries is contingent upon the existence of a state of facts
at the time of the settlor's death.48 Clearly, the members of the American
Law Institute meant that the trust is testamentary only if the settlor's death
is a condition precedent to the passage of any title to the cestui, precedent
to the trust itself. The Restatement enumerates the four instances in which
the settlor's death is considered such a condition:
the intended trust may fail, therefore, either 1) where the conveyance is incom-
plete for want of delivery or because it was not intended to be effective until the
settlor's death; 2) where the conveyance is ineffective because the trust property
is not designated during the lifetime of the settlor; 3) where the conveyance is
ineffective because the trustee is not designated during the lifetime of the settlor;
4) where, although the conveyance is effective, the intended beneficiary is not
designated during the lifetime of the settlor.49
It is submitted that these same principles can be applied to gifts inter vivos.
They are testamentary only if the donor's death has in some similar manner
been made a condition precedent to the gift itself, precedent to the passage
of any interest to the donee. This will be so in any case; 1) where the gift was
incomplete for want of delivery at the donor's death; 2) where the gift was
not intended to be effective-in interest-until his death; 3) where the prop-
I RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 56 (2d ed. 1959).
"Id. at Comment f.
"Id. at Comment a.
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erty is not ascertainable during his lifetime; 50 or 4) where the donee was not
designated during his lifetime.5 1 The first of these groups need not concern
us here. We concede that no gift, absolute or revocable, is valid without a
proper delivery. Nor are the third and fourth groups of primary concern.
They are merely particularizations of the principle found in the second
group, i.e., the donor cannot have a present intent if either the donee or the
property is not identifiable for these are essential elements of that intent.
It is the second group that is of primary concern. How can we tell when the
donor intended the gift to be effective in interest?
Many cases have held that discovering this intention is the key to deter-
mining whether or not a gift is testamentary. 52 In so far as revocable gifts are
concerned, however, this involves determining whether the donor intended
the gift to be immediately effective to transfer a defeasible title to the donee
or whether he intended the transaction only to pass an absolute interest at
the moment of his death? Unfortunately the distinction between a dispo-
sition to take effect only on the death of the donor and one to take effect im-
mediately but subject to revocation at the donor's whim is evanescent and
difficult even for the well trained lawyer to grasp. How can we expect a lay-
man to form an intent about so subtle a matter? We cannot. The most that
we can do is look at all the circumstances of the transaction and impute a
fictitious intent to the donor. It is submitted that when imputing such an
intent, we should impute a valid one--one that will sustain the transaction
and give effect to the manifested desires of the donor-unless there is some-
thing in the transaction that affirmatively manifests an invalid one.53 This
is what is done in the trust cases. We assume that the settlor intended the
reserved power to qualify the estate of the donee in the absence of special
circumstances. 54 This is but another step in the liberal trend of construing
10 See In re Salzwadel, 171 Wisc. 441, 177 N.W. 586 (1920) (attempted gift of all property
owned at death); Ladman v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 130 Neb. 460, 265 N.W. 252 (1936)
(advancements to be considered in determining shares of donees).
This is the principal difficulty with gifts of the balance remaining in a fund or bank ac-
count at the donor's death; see herein inIra, Part V. It is usually held, however, that a gift
of the balance of a fund remaining after donor's funeral expenses are paid is valid; see, e.g.,
Northern Trust Co. v. Swartz, 309 Ill. 586, 141 N.E. 433 (1923); In re McCredy's Estate, 72
N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sur. 1947), aff'd, 274 App. Div. 363, 83 N.Y.S.2d 806, appeal denied, 274 App.
Div. 1085, 86 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1949); Reynolds v. Maust, 142 Pa. Super. 109, 15 A.2d 853 (1940).
' See Calvin v. Free, 66 Kan. 466, 71 Pac. 823 (1903).
52See Gordon v. Barr, 13 Cal.2d 596, 91 P.2d 101 (1939); Kuebler v. Kuebler, 131 So.2d 211
(Fla. 1961); Innes v. Potter, 130 Minn. 320, 153 N.W. 604 (1915); Kauffman v. Edwards, 92
N.J. Eq. 554, 113 Atl. 598, (1921); In re Sussman's Estate, 125 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sur. 1953), aff'd,
283 App. Div. 1051, 131 N.Y.S.2d 880, appeal denied, 284 App. Div. 844, 134 N.Y.S.2d 586
(1954); Rennie v. Washington Trust Co., 140 Wash. 472, 249 Pac. 992 (1926). See also 1
PAGE, WILLS § 6.16 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960).
IMims v. Ross, 42 Ga. 121 (1871) and Zeman v. Mikolasek, 75 N.D. 41, 25 N.W.2d 272
(1946) are good illustrations of circumstances affirmatively manifesting a testamentary in-
tent.
"See, e.g., Booth's Trust, 400 Pa. 117, 161 A.2d 376 (1960), where the court ignored an
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the testamentary language frequently found in poorly drafted instruments
in such a way as to give effect to the intention of the parties wherever pos-
sible.55 Moreover, since the courts recognize as a valid delivery only such acts
as indicate an intention that the transaction is to be immediately binding on
the donor and productive of legal consequences,56 it is a perfectly logical
step to take. Thus, it is submitted, that the same test should be applied in
determining whether or not a revocable gift is testamentary as that applied
to the revocable trust. If the donor has performed a sufficient act of delivery,
then the gift should be held testamentary only if there is something in the
transaction that affirmatively shows that the donor did not intend to im-
mediately pass at least a qualified interest to the donee.
When the cases are viewed in this light, when it is recognized that the
primary problem is in determining when the donor intended the transaction
to be effective in interest, it is clear that whether the donee receives a pos-
sessory or only a future interest is not of critical significance. Thus the gifts
were sustained in both Blanchard v. Sheldon57 and Gould v. Van Home,58
even though the former involved a revocable gift of a remainder-type in-
terest and the latter a revocable gift of a possessory interest. Of course, if
the donee receives a possessory interest, it is easier to see the immediate effect
of the transaction and to recognize the in praesenti character of the donative
intent. But we are familiar enough with gifts of future interests to know that
the fact that the donee does not receive the right to immediate enjoyment
does not necessarily indicate a testamentary intent.59
express provision that the remaindermen were to have no interest until after the life tenant
had died. See also 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 103 (1951); 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 26
(2d ed. 1959).
51 See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.89 (1952); 6 POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPER-
TY 241 (1958); RrrcHmiE, ALFORD, & EFFLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 308 (2d ed. 1961).
50 See herein supra, Part III.
43 Vt. 512 (1871), discussed supra in Part I.
43 Cal. App. 145, 187 Pac. 35 (1919), discussed supra in Part I.
* Gifts of future interests raise special problems of delivery. Since possession of a chattel
is generally required to enjoy the possessory interest in it, a gift of a future interest in such
property probably cannot be accomplished through a manual tradition. See SiMES & SMITH,
THE LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 445 (2d ed. 1956). A deed of gift is generally used in such
cases.
Most gifts of future interests have involved choses in action. It is generally held that a
donor may reserve a life estate in a chose while manually delivering the document that rep-
resents it into the hands of a donee. State ex rel. Shaffer v. Kuthy, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 14, 71
N.E.2d 183, 134, appeal denied 145 Ohio St. 516, 62 N.E.2d 199 (1945). And it has frequently
been held that the execution of a separate instrument of assignment containing language
indicating a division of ownership rights, and the purchase or registration of a chose in
such a way as to indicate a division of ownership rights are sufficient acts of deliyery to sus-
tain a gift of a partial interest to another. See, e.g., Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill.2d 62, 185 N.E.2d
850 (1962); Corkeem v. Salvation Army, 340 Mass. 165, 162 N.E.2d 778 (1959); Jackman v.
Jackman, 271 Mich. 585, 260 N.W. 769 (1985); Thatcher v. Merriam, 121 Utah 191, 240
P.2d 266 (1952). These forms of delivery have been the most common means of accomplish-
ing revocable gifts as well as gifts of future interests.
1966]
